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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Colin Harper Corbett
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2016
Title: Preferences for Effort and Their Applications
In this dissertation, we experimentally examine individual preferences of
effort, including time and risk preferences. In Chapter 3, we find that at least in
certain settings and mindsets, individuals are very patient in their time preferences
for effort, choosing to distribute effort evenly over time periods. However, they
do not always live up to the stated plans, suggesting dynamic inconsistency or
possibly two separate decision-making systems in the mind. This relates to our
model in Chapter 2: a dual-self model of allocating effort between time periods in
working toward a larger goal including incomplete information between different
mindsets in the same person. Chapter 4 examines the risk preferences for effort,
as a measurement of the utility function of effort, and finds that in this setting,
subjects are very risk-averse over effort, compared to their preferences over money:
they greatly avoid the possibility of having to complete a large number of tasks.
These experiments and model help provide an understanding of how individuals
allocate the scarce resource of time and energy to tasks they must complete.
iv
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF AUTHOR: Colin Harper Corbett
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR
University of Rochester, Rochester, NY
DEGREES AWARDED:
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, 2016, University of Oregon
Master of Science in Economics, 2013, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Arts in Music and Economics, 2010, University of Rochester
Bachelor of Science in Applied Math, 2010, University of Rochester
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:
Experimental Economics
Behavioral Economics
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:
Graduating Teaching Fellowship, 2011-2016
Dale Underwood Outstanding Graduate Student Scholarship, 2012
Cum Laude, University of Rochester, 2010
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Professors Harbaugh and Kuhn for their guidance with the
experiments and analysis in chapters 3 and 4, and Professor Kolpin with his
guidance through the theory in chapter 2. I thank Ben Fitch-Fleischmann for
allowing me to run the experiment in chapter 3 in his class, and the University
of Oregon Department of Economics for funding the experiment in chapter 4.
I also thank my parents and many friends for their support and encouragement
throughout my time here.
vi
For all my teachers, in all aspects of life: parents, family, friends, educators, and
mentors.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. GOALS, REFERENCE POINTS, AND DISAPPOINTMENT COSTS: A
MODEL OF SELF-CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. Possible Outcomes of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5. Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
III. ESTIMATING TIME PREFERENCES FOR SCHOOL WORK USING
CONVEX TIME BUDGETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3. Experimental Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4. Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5. Descriptive and Aggregate Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.6. Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
IV. RISK PREFERENCES FOR REAL EFFORT TASKS . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3. Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4. Test Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5. Aggregate Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
viii
Chapter Page
4.6. Individual Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
REFERENCES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Commitments (missing Family and Social time) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2. Allocation Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3. Allocation within Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4. Review Question Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5. Real Effort Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6. Effort Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7. Money Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8. Individual Histograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
9. Individual Scatter Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
x
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Reduced Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2. Sample Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3. Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4. Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5. Day of the Week . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6. Question Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7. NLS Structural Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8. Losses Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9. Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
10. Error Structure Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
11. Parameter Estimates for Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
12. Parameter Estimates for Leisure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
13. Parameter Estimates for Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
14. Separated Regressions, Not Reframed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
15. Order Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
16. Demographic Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
17. Risk Attitude Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
18. Personality Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
19. Individual Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
20. Individual Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
xi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Economics, the study of the allocation of scarce resources, analyzes how
individuals allocate their personal scarce resources and their preferences over
these resources. However, most analysis of personal scarce resources has been
about money: while money is a convenient tool and very important for many
economic decisions, people make important economic decisions unrelated to money
throughout their daily lives. One primary domain of this is with time and effort:
individuals choose how to allocate the scarce resource of their time and physical
and mental energy on completing tasks and working toward goals. In short, they
are allocating effort. This dissertation aims to analyze how individuals make
decisions about effort on a personal level, including their preferences for effort and
decision-making processes behind it.
In Chapter 2, Goals, Reference Points, and Disappointment Costs: A Model
of Self-Control, we create a model to analyze the behavior of individuals working
toward a long-term goal, using a dual-self formulation in a game-theoretic setting.
Two decision-making processes in the same individual persons mind compete: a
long-term planning self, and short-term acting self. What separates this model from
other dual-self models is the incomplete information between the two selves: neither
side is fully informed about the time preferences of the other side, and thus cannot
fully predict actions the other player takes. This can lead to failing to live up to
plans, over-shooting when making plans, and other seemingly irrational behavior.
Elements of this model including time discounting of the disutility of effort and
risk preferences (utility curvature) of effort, both of which are not well-studied in
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the literature. The next two chapters analyze those two elements of the individual
decision-making processes behind effort.
Chapter 3, Estimating Time Preferences for School Work Using Convex
Time Budgets, analyzes time preferences for a specific type of effort: school work
in the form of multiple choice review questions. In a field experiment within an
introductory economics class, we analyze how students make decisions about
allocating school work over time. We find that students are surprisingly patient
when allocating tasks: they show a strong preferences for evenly allocating tasks
between time periods, especially when they complete the experiment early within
the survey period. However, when actually following through with these plans,
some students do not complete their assigned tasks. This provides some evidence of
the dual-self model of decision-making: students in a long-term mindset choose to
allocate effort evenly over time, then the short-term mindset fails to complete those
plans, aligning with predictions from the model in Chapter 2.
We analyze another major element of individual preferences in Chapter 4:
Risk Preferences for Real-Effort Tasks. In a lab experiment with two sessions,
subjects compared lotteries over gains and losses of money (in one session) and
effort/leisure (in the other). We find that subjects are considerably more risk-
averse over leisure (the absence of effort) than money, and that there was only
small correlation between risk preferences for money and those for leisure. Knowing
the shape of the disutility function of effort, especially in contrast to that of money,
allows us to make better predictions about individual behavior in settings like the
Chapter 2 model.
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CHAPTER II
GOALS, REFERENCE POINTS, AND DISAPPOINTMENT COSTS: A MODEL
OF SELF-CONTROL
Many models of self-control exist and make various predictions about the
consequences of dynamic inconsistencies, effort provision, and reference-based
utility. In this paper, we combine many of these threads into a model of long-
term goal setting and effort provision. Built on a framework of short-term actions
affecting long-term states, this model stylizes goal-setting and self-control as a
game played between two states of thinking, the long-term and short-term selves.
Underlying this model is a theory of reference-based utility of actions using goals
as reference points, labeled as a disappointment cost. Using aspects of this model,
we are able to predict and rationalize apparent failures of self-control. We provide a
simplified example of procrastination while writing a research paper.
2.1 Introduction
People set long-term goals and make plans to complete these goals all the
time, and sometimes complete them, but sometimes don’t. They may procrastinate
along the way, choose commitment devices to assist them, or work to avoid falling
short of their expectations for themselves. Sometimes these goals are completed,
but sometimes they are not. What explains how people fail to live up to their own
plans of action? Naively time-inconsistent preferences, high costs of self-control,
loss aversion, and more have been proposed as reasons for generating this seemingly
irrational behavior of unmet goals. This paper attempts to create a model of goal-
setting, action-planning, and execution that combines many of these elements that
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shows how agents, even when rationally setting strategies to maximize utility, can
be left with unmet goals and disappointment. Section 2 reviews the various threads
of the literature contributing to this research, section 3 proposes and defines all
aspects of the model, section 4 discusses some of the possible outcomes of the
model resulting from various internal assumptions, and section 5 concludes.
2.2 Literature
This model combines three ongoing threads in the behavioral economics
literature: the study of self-control and commitment, utility of effort and leisure,
and reference utility, and attempts to combine them into a single model of
goal-setting and effort provision. Just like many other models, we include time
preferences with possible dynamic inconsistencies, another topic of extensive
research.
Self-Control and Commitment
Many previous authors have created theories about long-term decision-making
regarding control and commitment. This includes models of procrastination, which
is often a failure to control oneself. One example of procrastination that does not
involve a control failure is Fischer (2001), which studies procrastination under time-
consistent preferences. However, time-consistent preferences don’t induce dynamic
inconsistencies, which the term “procrastination” usually implies. A more familiar
theory of procrastination comes from O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), who define
a model of procrastination, and extend it in (2008). Here they introduce the idea
of agents having incomplete awareness over their own dynamic inconsistency (as
opposed to complete awareness or complete naivete´). We model this incomplete
self-awareness as unknown player types in a Bayesian game.
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With some awareness of their own dynamic inconsistency, agents would be
expected to desire some sort of commitment device or otherwise struggle for self-
control - various ways agents counteract dynamic inconsistencies. Laibson (1997)
creates a theoretical commitment device that agents use to to control themselves
in future periods, knowing their own hyperbolic discounting, and models these
decisions as a game between different selves in different time periods. Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001) discuss preferences for commitment devices to counteract
temptation or tendencies to procrastinate. Commitment devices, reviewed by
Bryan et al. (2010), have been shown to work in reducing dynamically inconsistent
behavior in a number of contexts, but in an experiment studying effort provision,
Bisin and Hyndman (2014a) find little evidence for effectiveness of external
commitment devices to prevent procrastination on real-effort tasks. In our
model, we essentially use an internal commitment device in the form of internal
disappointment to model behavior when external commitment devices may be
unfeasible.
To explain the occurence of dynamic inconsistencies and seemingly irrational
behavior, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and Fudenberg and Levine (2011) introduce
a model of dual-selves: a long-term self who makes plans, and a short-term self who
acts on these plans. This idea of two seperate decision-making systems in the brain
in based on neuroscience evidence (see McClure et al. (2004)), and aligns fairly well
with introspection. We borrow heavily from this set-up, but change a number of
important assumptions, especially including not assuming the possibility of perfect
self-control.
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Reference Utility
The idea of utility being based on reference points first appeared in the
idea of prospect theory from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and
Kahneman (1991), which addressed the concept of gain-loss utility, and has
appeared across various areas of the literature since. However, the topic of how
agents formed reference points was left unsettled, and remains an open question.
One original idea for how agents form expectations was the status quo, advocated
by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). But currently, a leading candidate for a
model of reference points is expectations - instead of basing your reference point
for today on where one was yesterday, one uses yesterday’s beliefs about today as
a reference point. Many times these are identical, but often are not. Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) first modeled reference-based utility using expectations as a reference
point, and continued on that subject in Koszegi and Rabin (2007) and Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009). Matthey (2008) introduces reference-based utility over expectations,
which relates to our consistency cost function.
Providing experimental evidence in a controlled setting for expectations as
reference points is Ericson and Fuster (2011); others have found similar results in
applied microeconomics. Gill and Prowse (2012) find further evidence of choice-
acclimated expectations as reference points in a tournament setting, labeling
this phenomenon as disappointment aversion. But actions taken by oneself as a
reference point have not yet been studied.
Utility of Effort
Much of the behavioral literature focuses on utility over consumption
generally, or money specifically. However, the model proposed in this paper focuses
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on effort provision toward a goal, rather than consuming material goods or money.
In one sense, effort provision is loss of leisure, subject to framing effects. But
disutility of effort is felt as more than just a loss of leisure: Kurzban et al. (2013)
propose that effort provision is costly because executive function is a limited
resource subject to opportunity costs. However, the disutility of effort is not
directly comparable to consumption utility, so the creation of new models for effort
is warranted. From Augenblick et al. (2015) we also know that time preferences
for effort-related tasks can be different than time preferences for money and
consumption, giving a basis for creating different models to describe effort than
consumption.
Abeler et al. (2011) provide some experimental evidence for changing
provision of effort based on changing expectation-based reference points, although
these reference points are experimentally controlled, rather then endogenously
generated.
Game Theory
While the game theory structure of our model is mostly very standard, it
employs a few specific elements worth citing. The structure of the entire model is
based on Stackelberg competition based on Stackelberg (published 1934, finally
translated 2011). However, because there is uncertainty in player types, we have a
Bayesian game, whose structure was standardized by Harsanyi (1967). Stackelberg
Bayesian games have received the most interest recently in the field of security,
with a defender choosing a strategy to counter an attacker of unknown type.
Future work will delve more carefully into this literature for possible applications.
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2.3 The Model
In this paper, we present a model of interaction between the short-
term perspective of an individual, referred to as the “short-term self”, and
the perspective more focused on the long term, known as the“long-term self”.
Generally described, there is a long-term goal over a span of time. In each period,
the long-term self selects a plan of action to work toward that goal, then the
short-term self sees the plan and chooses an action to take. This is similar to a
Stackelberg competition model, with the short-term self taking the long-term self’s
plan as a given while deciding which action to actually perform, while the long-
term self has to take into account the short-term self’s possible reactions when
forming a plan.
Preliminarily, time periods in this model are most easily imagined as days,
but could be extended to weeks or months or even shortened to hours; examples
will assume days.
States and Transitions
The basic structure behind our model is as follows: an individual experiences
a state variable at a particular time, st ∈ St. Examples include current level
of fitness, level of skill on a musical instrument, or personal weight; throughout
this paper we will follow the example of progress on a research project. For
model tractability, we assume that the state is real-valued, so progress is easily
measurable; this could be time to run a mile, percentage of a musical piece
mastered, or for our running example of a research project, number of hours
invested into the project. This state is affected by actions the individual takes:
exercising, practicing that instrument, or working on research. (“Effort” can also
8
describe the action taken when applicable.) The action taken in time period t is
described as at ∈ At, and the process through which actions affect the state is
described by h(at|st−1) - how actions affect the state depends on the current level of
the state. While actions may not be real-valued, the way they affect the state must
be. Therefore, the state after period t is described as:
st = g(st−1) + h(at|st−1) + t (2.1)
where g(st−1) is how the state evolves by itself: often static (level of work
completed) or tending toward zero (level of fitness); and where t is external
variation in the state. This can include both external variation in the state (like
computer crashes) and variation in the effectiveness of effort (like a problem being
harder than anticipated, or external distractions). Let q(t) be a probability density
function for the distribution of possible values of t. This distribution may vary
with time, but for simplicity, we assume that the distribution is independent of
all other elements of the model. Because of this stochasticity, agents can rarely
make perfect predictions about the evolution of the state, but instead predict
distributions. Note that we assume both g(•) and h(•) are time-invariant, that
is, the evolution of the state and the effect of actions are the same in all periods.
However, it is possible for the effect of effort to depend on the current level of the
state when there are diminishing marginal returns of effort, such as in improving
fitness levels. We assume there exists a null action a0t such that h(a
0
t |st−1) = 0∀st−1
- the effects of not working at all do not depend on the current state.
The time formulation of equation 1 implies that at the beginning of period t,
agents see state st−1, and only after the action in period t has been realized does
the state st actually occur. This implies that the relevant state we assign to “today
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” occurs at the end of the day. For example, in completing a research project, every
day our researcher wakes up, sees the amount of work completed by the previous
night st−1, completes a certain amount of work at, then after completing his work,
evaluates his progress for that day st. We also assume that the model ends at time
period T , so sT is the final realization of the state at the end of time period T,
which is the final result of interest to the agents.
Structure and Information
As stated before, our model includes two agents, both aspects of the same
individual, the short-term self and the long-term self. We assume that the long-
term self is working toward an external goal with a particular deadline, s∗T :
reaching some level of fitness for an upcoming race, being able to perform a musical
piece in a particular performance, or completing a research project by a deadline.
Note that this goal is chosen externally from the model, and that the workings of
the model do not affect the goal. Although he is working toward a goal, the actual
objective of each agent is to maximize expected discounted utility - we assume this
utility includes the benefits of reaching the goal and the costs of getting there.
While the utility of the long-term self is dependent on reaching the goal, only
the short-term self is capable of taking actions at and thus influencing the state
through the transition function, leading the state toward the final goal. In order
to influence the short-term self’s choice of action, the long-term self sets a plan of
action every period, a∗t , which acts as a reference point while the short-term self is
making decisions.
These two agents interact in a Stackelberg-style game: every period, the long-
term self acts first by setting the plan a∗t to influence the decision-making of the
short-term self. Then the short-term self acts second by choosing the action, at,
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which may or may not match the set plan. In our example, a researcher may set a
plan to work on a paper for five hours on a day, but could fail to achieve that plan
and end up only working for three hours. Note that because plans and actions are
just strategies in order to maximize utility, it is possible that they won’t lead to the
stated external goal, if it is not feasible or the actions required to reach the goal are
too costly to be justified.
In this model, the short-term and long-term have time preferences over
the length of the game, with which they weigh utilities from different periods.
Letting k be the subscript designating the short-run self, and l designating the
long-run self (with i indexing agents), γt,k and γt,k represent the discount factors
for the time period t units into the future for the two agents, respectively (so, in
period 3, preferences for time period 6 would be γ3,i). For simplicity, let us only
consider dynamically consistent preferences: the relative discount factors for two
time periods do not depend on the reference time period. With this assumption,
agents must behave as exponential discounters, with discount factors determined
by a single discount rate δ: γt, i = δti This allows optimal strategies to be time
consistent, and not varying with time.
This assumption about discounting differs from previous models of self-control
in which only the long-term self was forward-looking, while the short-term self was
assumed to be solely focused on the current period. This model generalizes these
assumption to allow the short-term self to
γk,t ≤ γl,t∀t (2.2)
Or alternatively, given exponential discounting:
11
δk ≤ δl
These time preferences present the possibility of an information asymmetry in
our model: it is likely that the long-term self is not fully aware of the level of
These beliefs can be modeled through an approach from Harsanyi: each agent
assumes that his own preferences are determined by his assigned type, and the
preferences of the other agent are determined by the other agent’s assigned type.
Both types are assumed by both agents to be drawn from common-knowledge
distributions of possible types. Note that as long as these assumptions are
common knowledge between the agents, it doesn’t matter if they are “correct”:
preferences may in reality be completely deterministic, but if agents believe they
are randomized, the effects on the model’s predictions are the same as if they
were truly random. We define these preferences with types: θi is the type of agent
i, drawn from a set of Ni possibilities Θi. The θi type defines time preferences
{γi,τ}Tτ=t: a string of discount factors for all periods. Θi must include a type
corresponding with the true string of time weights for the respective agents, but
also includes a finite number of other possible strings that obey our assumptions
about time preferences.
Both agents also assume an initial distribution of possible types for both
agents, modeled as f(Θk × Θl), from which types were assumed to be initially
drawn. (Let F (•) be the set of possible distributions). This distribution is common
knowledge. F (Θk × Θl) only includes distributions where the long-term self is
always at least as patient as the short-term self: the probability of a draw where
the type of the long-term self is less patient than the type of the short-term self is
zero. Each agent obviously knows the realization of his own preference type, but
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not that of the other agent; however, knowing his own type, each agent can assume
a conditional distribution of the other player’s type: for example, f(Θk|θl) is the
long-term self’s inferred beliefs about the distribution of types of the short-term
self (drawn from F (Θk|θl)). As an example, if there were only two possible types of
time preferences across both agents (say, impatient and patient), then a long-term
self who knows he is impatient would know the short-term self has to be impatient
too, as the short-term self must not be more patient. But a patient long-term self
would not be certain of the short-term players type, as either a patient or impatient
short-term self is possible.
On each information set (and thus in every time period), each agent has
beliefs about the other player’s type: βt,i. These beliefs are a distribution of types
for the other player in a particular time period. The collected beliefs across every
time period and information set for each player are modeled as βi. These beliefs
are likely within the set of possible distributions (βt,l ∈ F (Θk|θl) for the long-
term self), but having unjustified, impossible beliefs is still covered by the model.
In equilibrium, as agents observe actions from the other player, they can update
their beliefs about the other player’s type from the initial assumed distribution.
f(Θk|θl, •) denotes the equilibrium beliefs of the long-term self about the short-
term self’s type, given a particular information set. In a Weak Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, these beliefs on information sets that may occur with non-zero
probability must be “correct”: based on the initial common-knowledge distribution
of types.
While time preferences are the likeliest source of information asymmetries in
this model, a similar modeling strategy could potentially be used for other elements
of the utility function, especially with types over disappointment functions or
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consistency costs (explained later). However, we will not attempt to model these
in this paper.
Actions and Strategies
In each period, each player makes one move: first, the long-term self sets a
plan of action a∗t . Then, the short-term self selects an realized action, at, chosen
from a set of possible actions for that period At. This set describes the actions that
the short-term self is capable of making in a particular time period; it could be the
number of hours available to work in a day, the number of miles he is capable of
running, etc. At could also be a non-numeric choice space, like selecting which food
to eat. We do assume that At always includes a null action: a
0
t ∈ At. The long-
term self’s plan of action a∗t is chosen from the set of possible plans: A
′
t. If only
feasible plans are possible, then A′t = At, but if unfeasible plans are possible (like
working 25 hours in a day), At ⊂ A′t. If At and A′t are non-numeric choice sets, then
we assume there exists a metric over these spaces with which agents can compare
distance, in order to determine consistency costs and disappointment (more on
these in section 3.5).
Coming into each period, the information set of the long-term self includes
the full history of the state, and all previous plans and realized actions: {sτ}t−1τ=0
and {aτ , a∗τ}t−1τ=0. The short-term self term self also observes the sequence of states
and previous plans and actions, but additionally observes the plan for the current
period: a∗t . Along with observing these information sets, both agents can use these
observations to update their beliefs about the probability distribution of types
for the other agent. For example, if the long-term agent observes actions that
would typify a present-biased type from the short-term self, he may increase the
probability of present-biased types in his believed distribution. Therefore, with
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every information set an agent sees, there is an associated belief distribution for
that agent.
The strategies of the long-term self are thus mappings from the product of
all previous state, action and plan spaces, to the space of possible plans of action,
conditional on the type of the long-term self. For the short-term self, strategies are
mappings from the same space plus the current period’s plan space map, to the
current action space, conditional on the short-term self’s type. The initial assumed
distribution of types of the two different agents obviously factor into forming a
strategy, but they are part of the structure of the game and the same for every
information set. Also, while the updated beliefs about the type of the other agent
will influence the decision-making, these beliefs are fully determined by the initial
distribution and the observed states and actions that the agent uses for updating, -
including them in the mapping does not bring any new information.
We use σi,t to represent the portion of the strategy in time period t - contrary
to standard game theory notation, we assume only pure strategies are possible,
even though we use σ, as s already denotes the evolving state.
σt,l : Π
t−1
τ=0(Sτ )× Πt−1τ=0(Aτ )× Πt−1τ=0(A′τ )×Θl → A′t (2.3)
σt,k : Π
t−1
τ=0(Sτ )× Πt−1τ=0(Aτ )× Πtτ=0(A′τ )×Θk → At (2.4)
As a shorthand, we use ωt−1 ∈ Ωt−1 to designate the entirety of information
(states, plans, and actions) from the beginning through the end of time period t−1,
and thus available at the beginning of t. Strategies could then be defined more
compactly:
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σt,l : Ωt−1 ×Θl → A′t (2.5)
σt,k : Ωt−1 × A′t ×Θk → At (2.6)
This shows the strategy for each player for actions in time period t. For ease
of notation, we also define ω∗t−1 as the information set ωt−1, plus the plan that the
long-term self makes in period t. The complete strategy for each player is then the
product of these one-period strategies across all future time periods.
At any particular information set, each agent is likely to be unsure about the
type of the other agent. Observing the plans or actions in the past of the other
player given a particular information set, and inferring what optimal strategies
would be in those situations given different player types, each agent can use Bayes’
rule to determine the likelihood of different types for the other player. We model
these beliefs as f(Θk|θl, ωτ−1): the long-term self’s beliefs about the distribution
of short-term player types on a particular information set in period τ ; the short-
term self’s beliefs would additionally be dependent instead on ω∗τ−1. Therefore,
each player has beliefs about the other player’s type for all information sets; any
equilibrium strategy would necessarily have these beliefs associated with it. This
belief structure is consistent with a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, assuming
optimal strategies.
Payoffs
We assume that in each period, each agent receives utility from the
realizations of the various strategies, and works to maximize his discounted
expected utility. The expected utilities of each player, determined by his own
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strategies and strategies of the other player (including all possible types), are shows
below.
Expected discounted utility of strategies for the short-term and long-term
selves:
Ul(σl, σk, t|ωt−1, θl, βl) =
Et,l
[ T∑
τ=t
γτ−t,l(θl)
[
ml(σk,τ(•)) + nl(sτ(•)) + C(σl,τ(•)|σk,τ(•))
]
|βl, σl, σk
]
(2.7)
Uk(σk, σl, t|ω∗t−1, θk, βk) =
Et,k
[ T∑
τ=t
γτ−t,k(θk)
[
mk(σk,τ(•)) + nk(sτ(•)) +D(σk,τ(•)|σl,τ(•))
]
|βl, σl, σk
]
(2.8)
where sτ(•) =g(sτ−1) + h(σk(•)|sτ−1) + τ
σl,τ(•) =σl,τ(ωτ−1, θl)
σk,τ(•) =σk,τ(ω∗τ−1, θk)
Expectations are taken over the other player’s type (the long-term self takes
expectations over θk and the short-term self takes expectations over θl) based on
beliefs at each information set, and over the stochastic element (t).
These equations are complicated; we will describe each element of the
equation in the following sections.
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First, the arguments of the function: utilities for each agent (Uk and Ul) are
dependent on the strategies of each agent, conditional on the current state, the
given player types, and the beliefs each player has about the other’s type in that
period.
From the current time period t, agents look into future time periods, indexed
by τ , and discount the utility they expect to receive in those time periods by γτ−t,i
- that is, the relative discount rate between the current time t period and future
period τ . The method of forming these expectations is described in section 3.6.
Here, σl,τ (ωτ−1, θl) notates the plan α∗τ made by the long-term self at time
τ , given type θl and history ωτ−1. Similarly, σk,τ (ω∗τ−1, θk) is the action ατ taken
by the short-term self at time τ , given type θk and history ω
∗
τ−1, which includes
the plan made by the long-term self in period τ . Note that histories (and thus
information sets) that occur in the future have a random element: ωτ−1 is unknown
to each player, and each player can only take an expectation over possible values of
that information set.
The (undiscounted, pre-expectation) contribution to utility from a single
period τ is shown as follows, presented here for simplicity only in terms of actions
and plans, rather than strategies.
uτ,l = ml(aτ) + nl(sτ) + C(a
∗
τ |aτ) (2.9)
uτ,k = mk(aτ) + nk(sτ) +D(aτ |a∗τ) (2.10)
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Now, let us explain each element in these utility functions. We have already
seen how the time preferences of each agent are determined by the type of the
player, and the assumptions we place on this string of time preferences: each agent
weights each period no less than the next one, and the short-term self weights
future periods no more than the long-term self does.
In this utility function, both the short-term self and long-term self derive
(dis)utility from both the action taken in that time period and the resulting state
that occurs in each period. Utility from actions is notated mk(at) and ml(at) for
the short- and long-term selves, respectively, and utility from states is nk(st) and
nl(st). It is possible for these utility functions to be time-dependent (like working
on research being harder on a Monday than a Wednesday), but we will not include
that in our notation, for simplicity.
We assume that taking non-null actions (that is, effort) is costly but success
is enjoyable: mi(a
0
t ) = 0, while mi(at) is non-increasing with increasing (positive)
distance from the null action (so disutility is non-decreasing), while ni(•) is non-
decreasing with increasing progress from zero, toward the goal. Essentially, subjects
are less happy having to work harder, but they like making progress. Also, both
selves experience increasing marginal costs of effort: in the simple case if At is
one-dimensional and continuous, then m(•) is concave (or the negative of effort
costs is convex). In our example, increasing the number of hours of research in one
day decreases the utility of that day, with each hour of research becoming more
unpleasant.
The long-term goal s∗T fits into the model by affecting the state-based utility
of the long-term self (and possibly that of the short-term self): the utility of
reaching the goal at the deadline is much greater than the utility of not reaching
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it: nl(s
∗
T )  nl(sT )∀sT < s∗T - there is a large discontinuity in nl(•) at s∗T . This
drives the long-term self to maximize his utility by attempting to reach this goal.
Consistency Costs and Disappointment
The final two unexplained elements of the utility function are C(•) and D(•),
known as Consistency Cost and Disappointment, respectively.
We assume that when setting goals, the long-term self takes into account how
closely the realized actions of the short-term self will match the set plan. When
the short-term self fails to live up to the plan, the long-term self experiences some
utility penalty. We model this as a Consistency Cost: C(a∗t |at(θk)). Here, the long-
term self compares his stated plan to the action it would induce for all possible
types of the short-term self, having a particular consistency cost for each possible
short-term self type. (This cost then enters the expectation function as all other
terms). Essentially, if the short-term players actions are not consistent with the
plan he created, the long-term self experiences a cost. We assume this consistency
cost function is zero when a∗t = at, and decreasing (so increasing in absolute value)
with greater positive distance between action and plan - the farther the action
undershoots the plan, the more costly it is. There could likely be a discrete jump in
consistency cost as soon as a∗t > at, but we don’t require it in the model. When the
action is greater than the plan, however, this function could be positive, negative,
or zero, depending on how the long-term self feels about setting too low of a plan.
Note that this utility cost is not generated by surprise (other than an unlikely
type draw), as in equilibrium the long-term self knows what the short-term self’s
reactions will be for each possible type. There could be many psychological
explanations for this cost: one idea is that the long-term self believes his reputation
suffers when his plans are not obeyed. Or he feels ineffective and bad about his
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inability to influence the short-term self. Another idea is that setting a plan has
effects outside of just telling the short-term self what to do, including external
enforcement mechanisms, or getting irrationally attached to outcomes from
the plan. At the core of this function is that the long-term self uses the short-
term self’s action as a reference point from which to evaluate utility of his plan,
although the location of this reference point depends on the short-term self’s type.
Essentially, the effect of this consistency cost is preventing the long-term self from
setting unrealistically high plans.
The driving force of this model, however, is the assumption that the short-
term self feels disappointment from failing to achieve the plans set by the long-term
self, and this disappointment has a utility cost. Because the short-term self chooses
the realized actions, it is thus the short-term self who compares these actions to the
plan for the current period, and thus may experience disappointment, depending on
this comparison. And it is this feeling of disappointment that drives the short-term
self to follow the plans of action created by the long-term self; this feeling serves as
a sort of commitment device when no outside devices are possible. Disappointment
for period t is modeled by the function D(at|a∗t ); it depends on the comparison
between the realized action and the planned action; the plan acts as a reference
point from which the short-term self effectively feels loss aversion. We assume that
D(at|at,∗ ) = 0 if at = a∗t : that is, when the short-term self successfully implements
the plan of action, he feels no disappointment. This feeling of “disappointment”
we are describing is not disappointment with the state of the world, but rather
disappointment with oneself; it could also be described as self-loathing. We assume
that the short-term self only feels this particular type of disappointment about
things within his control; stochastic realizations do not affect his disappointment.
So if an agent worked very hard but for some external reason this work was
21
ineffective, he could rationalize his failure through the external reason, and not
feel disappointed. Note that the realized state (influenced by external elements)
does not enter this function, but only the action, which is fully controlled by the
short-term self. Because this model is mostly geared toward situations of pure self-
control, without external commitment devices or control, the only thing preventing
one from completing plans is oneself; avoiding disappointing oneself is the main
thing that drives plan completion in our model.
At this point in research, we can only speculate about the properties of the
disappointment function, as we only begin theorizing about its existence with this
paper. It is especially unclear what it “looks like” when its arguments are actions
instead of, say, consumption plans. We assume that disappointment is triggered by
some distance from a stated goal, but measuring distance over an action space can
be a difficult concept. To gain some intuitive clarity, let us think about an action
space with a single, continuous numerical dimension, such as hours spent studying
or calories consumed, and let us restrict our analysis to actions “worse” than the
stated plan, such as studying fewer hours than desired or eating more calories than
planned, where the agent would actually experience disappointment. The function
is still defined when the agent exceeds expectations, but this is not the realm of
focus for this analysis.
Even if we assume disappointment operates on a single numerical dimension,
we must also make some assumptions about the shape of the function. Some
assumptions are obvious: it is strictly monotonic and positively sloped, that is, it
takes negative values for disappointing actions, and more negative values for more
actions further away from the goal. We can also assume that there is a discrete
jump in the disappointment function, from zero to a negative value, when the
realized action moves away from the goal. Comparing disappointment in outcomes
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to the better-studied phenomenon of loss aversion in consumption plans opens the
possibility of additional assumptions. For one, a standard assumption about utility
over losses is decreasing marginal disutility of losses, making the function convex
in (effectively) quadrant III. That is, each unit of moving away from the goal is
less painful than the last. However, this may not align with psychological realities
regarding actions oneself is responsible for, as opposed to outside factors, and it
may be concave, especially over smaller absolute values of disappointment. We
analyze the effects of different disappointment function in section 5.1.
Expectations
When determining current expected utility, each agent must take expectations
of future possible utilities to make the best current decision. Et,k designates the
expectations of the short-term self, given information observed before generating
a strategy and the belief system at that information set- that is, ω∗t−1 and βt,k.
Similarly, Et,l is the expectation of the long-term self, based on ωt−1 and beliefs
βt,l. The two uncertain elements in the model are the player type, unknown to the
opposite agent, and the stochastic element τ , unknown until it is realized.
For the long-term player, expectations are formed in the following way: given
the long-term self’s strategy, a strategy for the short-term self, and a set of beliefs
for the long-term player, starting at a specific information set, he can predict the
probability of ending up at any particular information set next period, given his
plan for that period, the short-term self’s plan for that period, his beliefs about the
short-term player’s type, and the distribution for t. Then, for all of those resulting
information sets in the next period, he can predict probabilities for information
sets in the period after that, given strategies and beliefs in those future information
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sets. This process continues until the final period is reached, and probabilities are
determined for all possible information sets in the final period.
Associated with each of these possible final information sets is a specific
discounted utility, from the plans, actions, and state levels that brought the players
to that information set. The long-term self can then take the probabilities of all
these final information sets, multiplied by their utilities, and form an expected
discounted utility, from a current information set, set of strategies for each player,
and set of beliefs. The short-term self forms expectations and expected utility in a
nearly identical way, but with slightly different information sets.
Potential Equilibrium Equations
Presentation of the setup of the model is now complete - we have shown and
explained information, types, strategies, beliefs, and payoffs for both agents. In this
paper, we make no attempt to analyze the existence of an equilibrium in a general
setting - the assumptions we have made are too broad for this to be tractable.
But if an equilibrium of the model existed, a Weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
would be the condition of choice: an equilibrium includes optimal strategies for all
player types given their beliefs, and updated beliefs over these player types at all
information sets.
In an equilibrium, the following best-response conditions would hold. We
present them mostly for illustrative purposes, regarding the decision-making
processes of the two agents.
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σk(ωt−1, a∗t , t|θk, βk) =
argmaxσkEt,k
[ T∑
τ=t
γs,τ−t(θk)
[
mk(στ,k(•)) + nk(sτ (•)) +D(στ,k(•)|στ,l(•))
]
|βk, σl, σk
]
(2.11)
σl
(
ωt−1, t|θl, βl) =
argmaxσlEl,t
[ T∑
τ=t
γl,τ−t(θl)
[
ml(στ,k(•)) + nl(sτ (•)) + C(στ,l(•)|στ,k(•))
]
|βl, σl, σk
]
(2.12)
These equations state that the strategy of the short-term self from a
particular point in time onward is a best response to the strategy of the long-
term self given a set of beliefs, while the strategy of the long-term self over that
same time period is a best responses to the strategy of the short-term self given
a set of beliefs. These are fairly obvious equilibrium, but provide some clarity for
the thinking behind each agent’s decision. Also, in equilibrium, the beliefs of each
player must be justified by the original distribution and correct Bayesian updating.
In summary, the model in equilibrium works in the following way: the long-
term self picks a plan of action in order to maximize his utility, knowing that
the short-term self will react with a realized action in order to maximize his own
utility. While he knows the potential strategies of the short-term self given different
possible types, because he does not know the real type, he can only predict a
distribution of actions in that time period. The short-term self, on the other hand,
reacts to that plan of action and picks an action to maximize his utility, discounted
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at a different rate than the long-term self, although again taking into account
possible future strategies given different types. Both selves trace the effects of their
actions into the future into different distributions, then take expectations over all
these distributions over time.
2.4 Possible Outcomes of the Model
Now that all the elements of the model have been defined and presented,
we can discuss how these various elements interact together and the possible
results of this interaction. This model has been built in a very general way:
we have not assigned any magnitudes to any of our functions, and made few
comparisons. The actions predicted by the model depend greatly on the specifics
of the model, including shapes of the different utility functions, time preferences,
and information.
The simplest case to analyze is where both agents have complete information
(that is, F (Θk × Θl) is degenerate), and are able to precisely predict the actions
taken by the other agent in response to their own choices. Therefore, the long-
term self will only set plans knowing the exact response to those specific plans,
and can therefore do a better job of controlling the actions of the short-term self.
However, because in our current formulation of the model, the long-term self does
not take disappointment into account when maximizing utility, he can possibly
choose unrealistic goals in the hope of inducing behavior to avoid even greater
disappointment, depending on his consistency cost function. Note that this strategy
only works when the slope of the disappointment function is greater than the slope
of the disutility of effort.
A more plausible information structure is where each agent does not know
the type of the other agent. The most likely application of this is when the long-
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term self does not know the degree of present bias that the short-term self has,
and is likely to underestimate it in expectation. If the disappointment function
is high enough in magnitude, this won’t affect the outcome, as the short-term
self’s benefits to procrastination are outweighed by the disappointment function,
making following the plan the resulting strategy. However, if procrastinating is
the best strategy for the short-term self, even taking into account disappointment,
then unmet plans are possible. We will investigate this possible situation with a
numerical example in section 5.
We briefly mentioned the possibility of extending types to other elements
of the utility function; this would make an interesting extension. If we allow the
agents to not know the basic utility functions of the other agent, many more
complicated results would follow, and the possibilities are too great to analyze
here. But one likely case is that the long-term self does not know the shape of the
disappointment function. In other words, he does not know how powerful his goals
will be in the decision-making process of the short-term self. In this case, even if
the long-term self knows the time preferences of the short-term self and wants
to set goals to counteract these time preferences, the present-bias of the short-
term self may again be too strong to be counteracted by a weak disappointment
function.
2.5 Conclusion and Future Work
Combining a number of different theoretical elements, we have created a
model with a broad range of possible assumptions to model goal-setting and effort
provision in a multi-period setting. In different cases of information awareness
between the two agents, we find that behavior found in the real world (ineffective
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goal-setting, problematic procrastination, and more) can be produced by the
interactions within the model.
This model leaves open the possibility of extensive future work. For
one, continuing to refine the model on a purely theoretical level is likely to be
productive; in its current state, the model is almost too cumbersome and possibly
introduces too many new concepts at once (a disappointment functions, utilities
over both actions and states, two sets of full time preferences, etc.). Breaking
down the model into smaller components and studying the effects of adding each
component to more standard models would be useful and informative.
Generally, the utility and costs of effort and leisure has not been nearly as
extensively studied as that of consumption and money, and this model hopes to
contribute toward investigating how effort and leisure affect utility in general.
Studying the shape of the different utility components (especially including the
cost of effort and the disappointment function) with experimental techniques
could be rewarding. Also, experimentally studying time preferences as related
to effort in both a long-term state of mind and a short-term state of mind could
be very revealing. While some of this has been done before, continuing to study
self-awareness of tendency to procrastinate, especially in a more controlled setting,
would be especially helpful in working toward a realistic set of assumptions for this
model.
We hope that the structure and assumptions set up in this model can help
economists better understand human behavior of goal-setting and effort provision,
and how real-life behavior defies traditional logic, but may do so in unexpectedly
structured ways.
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CHAPTER III
ESTIMATING TIME PREFERENCES FOR SCHOOL WORK USING CONVEX
TIME BUDGETS
Time preferences for money have been extensively studied, but experimental
studies of time preferences for effort and leisure are rare. Using a field experiment
embedded in an introductory economics class, we studied time preferences for
completing multiple-choice review questions for graded credit. Through an online
survey students were given convex time budgets with varying time durations,
intertemporal exchange rates, and numbers of questions, and selected how many
review questions to complete during given dates, and then completed the questions
online. Reduced form analyses and aggregate structural results show that many
student subjects have strong preferences for allocations that evenly divide work
across time periods. Many others are effectively debt-averse - they choose to
complete questions sooner, even when that results in more total work. Some
expected outside effort and time commitments (class attendance, jobs, social
events, etc.) had small and marginally significant effects on choices. Incomplete
task completion may indicate subjects were attempting to implement commitments
and failing, and that the experiment may not have correctly elicited true time
preferences.
3.1 Introduction
Time preferences are one of the most well-studied topics in behavioral
economics, with many different experimental techniques developed to analyze
discount rates, functional forms of the discount function, degrees of present-bias,
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and more. However, most previous work has only investigated time preferences
for money. Time preferences for things other than money, like consumption or
leisure, could be very different. The literature on procrastination, which often is in
reference to effort versus leisure, rarely relates to experimental literature, nor does
it acknowledge that individuals could have different time preferences in different
domains. Also, very little has been done to investigate how much outside factors
affect specific decisions about allocations over time, such as outside income or
expenditures, or outside effort provision.
In this experiment, we use a recently-developed experimental technique
(Convex Time Budgets) to investigate time preferences that students have for
completing school work. As part of an Introduction to Microeconomics class, this
experiment had students allocate the task of completing multiple-choice review
questions between different time periods with different exchange rates between
questions earlier and questions later, to investigate how students chose to allocate
effort under different circumstances.
Results show that in aggregate, students responded to differences in prices,
but not significantly to differences in how far in the future the tasks would occur.
However, there was considerable variation in how individuals behaved, partially
caused by outside time commitments and variation in the date on which the
experiment was completed, but also from apparent variation in time preferences.
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the topic, including studies about
time preferences, real-effort tasks, and procrastination. Section 3 describes the
experimental procedure, while section 4 presents the empirical strategies employed
in analysis. Section 5 shows results from the population, including qualitative and
quantitative results, and Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
The study of time preferences can be divided along two different criteria into
four categories of preferences: gains versus losses, and monetary rewards versus
primary consumption rewards. (Note that while economists use the phrase “time
preferences”, psychologists tend to use the phrase “delay discounting” to refer to
effectively the same thing.) This experiment will focus on time preferences for
losses of primary consumption - specifically, the loss of leisure through real-effort
tasks. This particular combination has received very little focus in the literature,
yet other areas related to it (time preferences for monetary gains and losses, and
consumption gains) have received large amount of attention, particularly in recent
years (Hardisty et al. (2013) contains a graph showing a dramatic increase in
research volume on the subject).
There have been proposed many mathematical models of time preferences,
including most prominently hyperbolic discounting (first proposed by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)) and quasi-hyperbolic discounting (from Laibson (1997)).
Doyle (2013) surveys all the various models of time preferences, and the underlying
theories and assumptions that generate those models. This paper will align
with much of the rest of the current economic literature, and use Laibson’s
quasi-hyperbolic or beta-delta preferences, due to its previous empirical success,
theoretical simplicity and ease of use.
The vast majority of the economics literature on time discounting has
examined discounting of monetary gains - see Frederick et al. (2002) for a review of
earlier work. Because of the focus this area receives, experimental and econometric
techniques have developed most rapidly here. More recently, Andersen et al.
(2008) investigate risk and time preferences in a representative sample of the
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Danish population through a Double Multiple Price List (DMPL) procedure, while
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) use Convex Time Budgets (CTB) in an attempt to
estimate utility curvature separately from risk preferences. These two approaches,
DMPLs and CTBs, are currently the most favored techniques for eliciting time
preferences from individuals while controlling for utility curvature. Both sides have
criticized the approaches of the other: the DMPL researchers have stated that the
results from CTBs do not align with how individuals should act according to their
assumptions (see Harrison et al.), while the CTB researchers have stated that using
risk preferences to elicit utility curvature related to time preferences attempts to
equate two unrelated sets of preferences (see Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b)). See
Andreoni et al. (2013) for a theoretical and econometric comparison of the two
approaches. Hardisty et al. (2013) find different methods with the same subjects
result in slightly different results.
The research on discounting of monetary rewards generally acknowledges that
individuals receive utility not from money but from the consumption that money
brings, and therefore studies of money discounting only provide an approximation
for time preferences of utility. Also, external capital markets exist for money,
allowing for arbitrage to influence experimental findings. Cubitt and Read (2007)
discuss this connection and present different theories behind the connection
between monetary tasks and utility discounting and a theoretical model for dealing
with these differences. While monetary tasks can shed some light on discounting of
utility, they are certainly less than perfect.
Given this criticism, a few researchers have investigated time preferences for
direct consumption through giving primary rewards - consumables that are more
closely related to consumption utility at a particular time than money. The famous
Stanford Marshmallow Experiment (discussed in Mischel et al. (1989)) began to
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investigate the delay of consuming goods (or primary rewards), which essentially
reveals time preferences. McClure et al. (2007) investigate the neuroeconomics of
primary rewards, finding the neurological pathways related to primary rewards
are similar to those of monetary rewards, but that even a ten minute time delay
between decision and reward (in this case sips of juice or water) can reduce
stimulation of the limbic system (the brain’s short-term pleasure system) when
making decisions. However, the nature of these small rewards makes scaling over
time and volume difficult. Estle et al. (2007) compare discount rates for directly
consumable goods, including candy, soda and beer, and finds that these goods are
discounted more steeply than monetary rewards, but that this difference disappears
when results are probabilistic. The utility from monetary gains is assumed to be
a conditioned response to anticipation of future rewards, rather than the direct
consumption utility of primary rewards. Reuben et al. (2010) find similar results
using real (rather than hypothetical) results.
However, these results are confounded by issues of magnitude and diminishing
marginal utility. Another problem is that demand for primary rewards can be
greatly affected by the state of mind of the individual regarding the rewards. We
know that time preferences for monetary rewards depends on the state of mind of
the individual, especially through exitation of pleasure-seeking neural pathways,
(see Van den Bergh et al. (2008) for an entertaining example), but appetite for the
particular primary reward is much more variable than appetite for more money (as
Reuben et al. (2010) discuss).
Along with differences between monetary versus primary rewards, time
preferences can also differ depending on if they are over gains or losses. Prospect
theory (from Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) assumes losses produce disutility
larger in magnitude to the utility from corresponding gains, but time preferences
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for losses can be completely different. Monetary losses exhibit some similar
elements of discount compared to gains - for example, Holt et al. (2008) find the
existence of preference reversals for losses, which implies a hyperbolic or quasi-
hyperbolic discount function, resulting in present-bias. However, there are many
differences in discounting of gains versus losses - Estle et al. (2006) show many
of the differences, including a smaller or even reversed magnitude effect for losses
compared to gains, but closer results for probabilistic gains and losses. Appelt
et al. (2011) create psychological explanations for these differences in discounting
behavior between gains and losses. Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) look not
specifically at time preferences, but at sequences of events, and investigate whether
subjects have preferences for worsening, improving, or flat sequences of events of
real-world outcomes, and find varied results.
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) also shows that mental accounting of debt and
payments is different from accounting of savings, and that individuals often prefer
to pay off debt or pay for consumption as soon as possible, even if it runs counter
to their economic benefit. However, much of the research on losses has been with
purely hypothetical rewards - in experiments, real losses (that is, forcing subjects
to give up their own money) must be compensated either beforehand through
endowments or afterward through rewards, both of which can complicate behavior.
In forthcoming work, Kuhn, Andreoni and others investigate discounting behavior
of real losses and find some counterintuitive results, suggesting that subjects view
debt very differently, possibly suggesting concave preferences for losses.
Investigating losses of primary rewards, however, is even more difficult.
Taking away consumption goods from experimental subjects is effectively
impossible unless they are endowed with them in the first place, which creates
problematic interactions with reference points. However, forcing subjects to expend
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leisure time on a task is one way of having subjects give up a consumption good
(leisure). Also, if the tasks involved include cognitive effort, this could potentially
cause disutility - Westbrook et al. (2013) investigate preferences for cognitive
effort and find subjects are willing to forgo monetary gains to avoid increased
cognitive effort tasks, although in other circumstances cognitive tasks may be
enjoyable. Therefore, we can view decreased leisure time and increased cognitive
load as effectively a loss of consumption utility. The purpose of our experiment is
to investigate time preferences for this disutility of effort generated by giving up
leisure and increasing cognitive load in a task that most rational people agree is
unpleasant - answering questions about economics!
Our experiment most closely resembles the experimental work of Augenblick
et al. (2015), who examine time preferences and commitment devices regarding
real-effort tasks. Subjects in this study allocate real-effort tasks, specifically
playing a modified Tetris game and transcribing fuzzy Greek letters, between two
time periods given different exchange rates. This is one of very few examples of
estimating time preferences for losses of primary rewards. However, the authors
do not present their findings as losses compared to gains of consumption utility,
and do not discuss the different aspects that preferences over losses can take
versus preferences for gains. The tasks included in the experiment were also basic,
requiring minimal cognitive effort, so subjects were only choosing to give up leisure
time instead of having increased cognitive effort and its associated disutility. Also,
while the experiment was designed to find present-bias and associated commitment
costs that could possibly reverse present-bias, the design only uses time scales
of one week between decisions, making it difficult to estimate discounting. Our
experimental procedure will be designed to more accurately measure discount rates
over slightly longer time periods and the degree of present-bias involved in losses
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of consumption. Augenblick and Rabin (aper) also investigate time preferences
for real-effort tasks, but use different monetary wages for tasks to investigate time
preferences. They also find significant evidence of present-bias, but their results
also don’t include outside effort, nor address the confounding effects of money.
Another paper using a similar real-effort task is Bisin and Hyndman (2014b)
- subjects must alphabetize nonsense words as a real-effort task. However, the
purpose of this experiment is not to specifically measure time preferences, but
rather find evidence of present-bias and how it effects procrastination behavior.
While procrastination behavior is the most obvious effect of present-biased
time preferences for real-effort tasks, measuring the degree of present-bias and
discounting that create this procrastination behavior is an important task.
3.3 Experimental Procedure
Our experimental procedure borrows heavily from Augenblick, Niederle and
Sprenger (2014), in using convex time budgets to estimate time preferences for real-
effort tasks, but introduces a number of new elements, including controlling for
opportunity costs, applying it to real-world academic applications, and attempting
to correlate our results with other indications of present-biased behavior.
Participants were recruited from a large Principles of Microeconomics course
through an in-class introduction to the experiment. Students could choose to either
participate in the experiment, including answering the included review questions,
or write a 5-page essay on microeconomics based on news articles. This alternative
assignment and its deadline structure may have created some selection bias, but
considering that the alternative assignment was more difficult and took more time,
and over 85% percent of students did participate, selection is not a major issue.
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After the in-class introduction and after taking the midterm exam, students
completed the experimental choices in an online survey, taken on a day of the
week of the students choice. As described in the introductory session and other
recruitment materials, subjects could choose which day of the week to complete
their preference choices and subsequent real-effort tasks. Students were also
informed that they would be completing tasks on the day they made their
allocations, two weeks from that date, and four weeks from that date. This allowed
subjects to plan around their outside commitments, making the experiment as little
of a hassle as possible, increasing participation, and eliciting responses based on
time preferences, not responses based on outside commitments. This allocation
process took place in the week after the midterm exam in the class.
The real-effort tasks in this experiment were multiple-choice review questions
drawn from the test bank of the microeconomics textbook used by that class.
These review questions were all based on subject material covered on the midterm
exam, and that would not be explicitly covered by the final exam (which only
covered material from the second half of the course). Therefore, there was no
incentive to complete questions closer to the final exam to be more prepared for
it, but there was an incentive to complete them closer to the midterm, as the
material was fresh in their minds. At the beginning of the online survey, subjects
were shown two examples of questions to help them gauge their difficulty and the
amount of time necessary to complete them. Then, subjects entered the number
of hours of outside commitments for each day they could complete questions,
which at the time were that current day, two weeks from that current day and
four weeks from that day (described as calendar dates, not relative times) from
the subjects perspective. These outside commitments included classes, study
time, social functions, and other categories. See figure 1 for an example (with two
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categories cut off). Subjects also rated their responses about commitments by level
of confidence.
In the primary section of the experiment, subjects allocated review questions
between two dates using Convex Time Budgets (CTBs), from Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a). Subjects made nine different allocations, one for each date
combination (three combinations of that present day, in two weeks, and in four
weeks), and one for each review question exchange rate (3:5, 5:5, and 5:3). For
example, given the 3:5 exchange rate, subjects were endowed with 35 questions
for the earlier time period, and could exchange 3 questions in the earlier period for
5 questions in the later, with eleven possible options. These options were presented
in a multiple-choice list. Subjects faced a minimum of five questions for each time
period within each CTB, to equalize transaction costs of completing tasks across
time periods. Due to the quantized nature of review questions versus money and
possible confusion about the options, this was chosen as the best presentation
option, as subjects also were able to view all of their different resulting options
immediately without doing any calculations. See figure 2 for an example.
To compare our results to previous work, students also completed CTBs for
allocating money between the same dates as they would complete review questions.
However, these allocations were only hypothetical, for budgetary and logistic
reasons, and possibly biased by the possibility of having to complete tasks on the
given days. Results from these decisions are not reported, as they show minimal
subject investment in those decisions.
For their final questions, subjects answered a number of basic demographic
questions, including year and major, and gave a self-rating about behaviors
related to procrastination, both in general (taken from Lay (1986)) and specific to
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FIGURE 1. Commitments (missing Family and Social time)
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FIGURE 2. Allocation Decision
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academic settings. These were used to investigate perceived real-world consequences
of having specific time preferences.
After entering their allocations and completing the survey questions, one
of the allocations of review questions was chosen at random for implementation.
Because each allocation covered two time periods, subjects were assigned questions
on two out of the three possible time periods. For questions to be completed that
day, subjects continued within the same online survey to the review questions to be
completed; for questions to be answered in the future, subjects received an email
link to the assigned questions early in the morning on the day on which they had
to be completed. Once all rounds of questions were completed, the percentage of
assigned questions answered correctly was submitted to the instructor of the course
to count for 5% of the final grade in the class.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Reduced Form Analysis
In the first stage of our analysis, we analyze a reduced-form model, testing
how subjects respond to differences in time, price, and outside effort, and how
different responses to demographic and survey questions influence choices of effort.
In this analysis, we use the number of questions allocated to the earlier period as
the dependent variable. There are a number of different empirical approaches to
this estimation, though.
Because subjects cannot choose fewer than five questions for any particular
time period, the data is effectively truncated, both above and below. The
coefficients in the baseline OLS model are therefore biased toward zero. The
traditional way of dealing with data censoring, the Tobit model, can resolve some
41
of this truncation problem. However, due to the experimental design, some data is
truncated above at 55, while other data is truncated at 35. The Tobit model can
only deal with one truncation point in each direction, so it would also return biased
results.
The solution to this issue is the Interval Regression, which is effectively a
generalized form of the Tobit model. This method uses two dependent variables,
an upper and lower bound for each data point, and estimates regressions using the
following likelihood function, where U∗ is the relevant upper limit.
L =
∏
xt=L
(1− Φ(x
∗
t − L
σ
)) ∗
∏
L<xt<U∗
(
1
σ
φ(
xt − x∗t
σ
)) ∗
∏
xt=U∗
(Φ(
x∗t − U∗
σ
)) (3.1)
Because the data is quantized by 5 or 3 questions, depending on the exchange
rate, we can also use an interval regression and assume that each data point only
indicates an interval between midpoints of choices, instead of a point observation at
each choice. The likelihood function for that is the following, where x1t and x2t are
the upper and lower bounds for each observation:
L =
∏
xt=L
(1− Φ(x
∗
t − L
σ
)) ∗
∏
L<xt<U∗
(Φ(
x2t − x∗t
σ
)− Φ(x1t − x
∗
t
σ
)) ∗
∏
xt=U∗
(Φ(
x∗t − U∗
σ
))
(3.2)
Structural Analysis
Following most previous work in time preferences, we assume that agents
intertemporally optimize their utility, based on a utility function. We assume that
this utility function is time-separable, stationary, and satisfies the independence
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axiom (so that we can ignore the probabilities of different options being selected).
In our case, we are looking at (dis-)utility of effort, which we assume is a combined
measure the mental or physical energy put into a task, and the time spent doing so.
For the functional form of the utility function, here effort in one time period is et,
we assume it is:
u(et) = − 1
α
eαt (3.3)
Here, α is the curvature of disutility of effort. α > 1 implies increasing
marginal cost of effort (or decreasing marginal utility of leisure), while α < 1
implies decreasing marginal cost of effort. We assume that agents maximize their
time-discounted utility (or minimize time-discounted costs) given the budget
restriction of having to complete a certain number of tasks. Unlike previous studies,
we assume that effort includes both effort related to the task, and effort related
to outside activities, such as studying, attending class, or participating in other
outside activities. So et = xt + ωt, where xτ is the number of questions allocated
in the experiment, and ωτ is the total outside effort predicted by the subject.
Therefore, agents have the following problem:
maxUt =
n∑
τ=0
γτ − 1
α
(xτ + ωτ )
α (3.4)
Importantly, we do not know how much effort specific outside tasks require,
compared to the effort involved in completing the review questions. Therefore, we
assume each outside task η has a weight θ, relative to review questions:
ωt = λ+
n∑
i=1
θiηi (3.5)
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We also assume that subjects have quasi-hyperbolic or beta-delta time
preferences:
γt =

1 t = 0
βδt t > 0
(3.6)
Note that unlike the traditional beta-delta model with preferences over gains,
our preferences are over negative utility. We know that individuals are often debt-
averse, and that promises of future utility losses are especially painful. Therefore, it
may be possible that β > 1, which would signify subjects being debt-averse.
The Convex Time Budget experimental procedure gives subjects a budget
under which they must maximize their utility. So, under this budget and given all
of our utility assumptions, subjects have to solve the following problem in each
task, over two periods:
max
xτ
− βt6=0δt(xt +
∑
θiηi,t)
α − βδt+k(xt+k +
∑
θiηi,t+k)
α (3.7)
s.t. P1xt + P2xt+k = m (3.8)
Nonlinear Least Squares
Our first estimation approach utilizes Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) to
estimate the parameters of the model. For this approach, we analytically maximize
utility and find the following condition:
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xt =
(mP2 + ωt+k)(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1)
(1 + P1P2(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1))
− ωt
(1 + P1P2(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1))
(3.9)
Substituting in the parameters to be estimated as defined above
(β, δ, α, θi, λi), and the data (m, P1, P2, ηi,τ ), and assuming an additive, normally
distributed error, we can estimate the above equation using the standard NLS
procedure.
This estimation strategy is flexible in its utility curvature assumptions: if
α > 1, subjects have increasing marginal disutility of effort (each task is worse
than the previous one), and will seek interior solutions on a budget. If α < 1,
there is decreasing marginal disutility (additional tasks become more tolerable),
and subjects will seek corner solutions.
However, a weakness of the standard NLS proceduce is its inability to deal
with the truncating issues related to corner solutions, which produces biased
estimates. Simulations show this bias is especially strong for the θi parameters.
Because subjects cannot assign fewer than five questions to either day in each
allocation, but may want to assign fewer than that or even negative questions, we
will observe corner solutions on both the upper and lower bounds of the allocation
of xt. Future work will implement methods to mitigate the bias that truncation
creates.
It may be that subjects view effort in different time periods differently, as
questions in different periods may require different amounts of mental effort, or
the expected grade payoff is different for them, accounting for the possibility of
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forgetting to complete questions. Therefore, we include two possible variations
on the estimating equation. In the first, baseline cost of effort changes additively
across different time periods: λt 6= λt+1. Second, we allow multiplicative scaling of
effort between different periods: effort = (xt + ωt)(1 + zt), with the normalizing
assumptions that z0 = 0. This allows subjects to assume different payoffs for
questions in different periods, or different cost of effort in different periods. While
varying α between periods (allowing the curvature of utility to change) would be
another possible route, allowing this makes the maximization problem algebraically
impossible in a closed-form solution.
Alternative Perspective
The previously described assumptions about utility are that subjects derive
disutility from effort, compared to a zero-effort baseline. However, another possible
perspective about subject’s utility is that they gain utility from leisure, and effort
represents a decrease leisure. Note that we are not discussing “gains” versus
“losses” of leisure compared to a reference point in the Prospect Theory sense,
as our experimental procedure does not compare gains versus losses. We are just
assuming that in this frame, agents maximize positive utility of leisure, instead of
minimizing disutility of effort. If we assume that λ is a daily leisure budget instead
of baseline daily effort, and effort subtracts from this daily leisure budget to form
total leisure lt, the utility formulation would be:
u(et) = (lt)
α′ = (λ− et)α′ (3.10)
The consequences of different utility curvature are very different given this
perspective. Here, α′ < 1 implies decreasing marginal utility of leisure (a standard
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assumption about goods in general, and within labor economics), which leads to
interior solutions, while α′ > 1 generates increasing marginal utility of leisure
(counter to many assumptions, but not impossible) and creates corner solutions.
(Compare to the curvature of the effort disutility function: α > 1 implies interior
solutions, and vice versa.)
The analytic maximization results are very similar, although now making
explicit the λ term which was previously included in the ωt term:
xt =
(mP2 + ωt+k − λ)(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1)
(1 + P1P2(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1))
− ωt − λ
(1 + P1P2(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1))
(3.11)
We can then use our previous methods of truncated NLS or Tobit estimation
to calculate all the same parameters, but including λ. This formulation can be
better compared with results for discounting of positive monetary income, as it
assumes a closer utility functional form to those previous studies.
3.5 Descriptive and Aggregate Results
Descriptive Results
Figure 3 shows the means of these allocation decisions shown on the budget
sets restricting the decision. We can see that the means for each time period
combination are nearly identical, and that the mean allocation is very close to
the middle of the given budget. Figure 4 shows a histogram of the number of
review questions selected for the first period in each of the nine decisions; Price
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FIGURE 3. Allocation within Budgets
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is the exchange rate between questions in the first period versus the second -
price = .6 means three questions in the first period are worth five in the second,
while price = 1.667 means five questions in the first period are worth three in the
second. Note that in the left column of graphs, the maximum number of questions
available in the first period is 35, while in other columns it is 55. From this graph,
we can draw a number of conclusions about the distribution of preferences from
visual inspection.
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FIGURE 4. Review Question Allocation
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One obvious trend in this data is the similarity of choice distributions across
time periods - there is very little apparent change when comparing decisions
between weeks 6 & 8 versus weeks 6 & 10 or weeks 8 & 10. This suggests that time
preferences play a smaller role in subject decision-making than prices and rules-of-
thumb, or that time preferences are not very strong.
Another prominent feature is that given an even exchange rate, individuals
have a strong preference for dividing work evenly - over half of subjects consistantly
choose an even split given an even exchange rate. This suggests minimal
discounting, but also possibly a reliance on rules-of-thumb when allocating tasks.
A main topic of research in this experiment is the curvature of the value
funciton for real-effort tasks - α in our model. As discussed, α > 1 implies
increasing marginal cost of effort, while α < 1 implies decreasing marginal
cost of effort. With α > 1, subjects would likely have interior solutions for the
maximization problem - they seek to balance their effort between the two time
periods until the marginal cost of effort is equal. But when α < 1, they would
likely have corner solutions - because each subsequent question gets easier, they
would want to complete as many as possible at one time. Within our results, we
find a number of corner solutions and a number of interior solutions, suggesting a
diversity of values for α for individuals.
Thinking about time preferences within each allocation decision, we find
that outside of the even exchange rate, many subjects seem to have a preference
for completing tasks sooner rather than later. Even when they could complete
fewer total questions by putting them off, many subjects choose to complete
more questions in order to do them sooner. This is especially apparent in the
right column, where doing more questions now results in more total questions.
This suggests that some subjects “preproperate.” This word, meaning to do too
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soon and serving as the opposite of procrastinate, is rarely used, but describes the
situation for some subjects well.
There are a number of possible behavioral explanations for this
preproperation. One is that subjects have a preference for improving sequences
of events - they want to get unpleasant tasks over with quickly, and therefore are
happier in the future. Subjects also might prefer to complete the review questions
while the class material on which they were based is fresh in their minds, or they
may fear forgetting to complete review questions on later dates.
Reduced Form Results
Just as in the histograms, our dependent variable of interest is the number of
questions allocated to the first period. Table 1 shows the reduced form estimation
for the various different structural parameters - Interval assumes most data is
point data, other than end points, while Interval2 assumes all data is interval
data between midpoints of selection points. Present indications whether or not
the comparison includes present bias (that is, includes the current period), Weeks
is the number of weeks between time periods for each allocation, Exchange is the
exchange rate between questions in the first period versus second, and Endowment
is the size of the initial allocation (which depends on the exchange rate). ClassA,
etc., are the time commitments in each category in the first and second date of
each allocation. Note that negative coefficients mean fewer questions completed
earlier, indicated increased procrastination, or decreased “preproperation”. All of
our reduced-form equations include clustering of standard errors at the individual
level.
We can see that in comparing between allocations, the coefficients Present
and Weeks are insignificant, and in fact are fairly tight zeros. This means that
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TABLE 1. Reduced Form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Tobit Interval Interval2
Exchange -7.851∗∗∗ -8.814∗∗∗ -8.892∗∗∗ -8.588∗∗∗
(-8.75) (-8.27) (-8.26) (-8.47)
Endowment 0.520∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(19.30) (16.88) (15.47) (16.35)
Present -0.121 -0.0406 0.0108 -0.0386
(-0.20) (-0.06) (0.02) (-0.06)
Weeks 0.0495 0.0461 0.0324 0.0408
(0.21) (0.17) (0.11) (0.15)
assignA 0.600∗ 0.667 0.701 0.672
(1.73) (1.61) (1.58) (1.62)
assignB 0.323 0.381 0.350 0.338
(1.01) (1.01) (0.87) (0.89)
workA -0.589 -0.785 -0.798 -0.741
(-1.40) (-1.49) (-1.40) (-1.39)
workB 0.548 0.696 0.723 0.686
(1.35) (1.32) (1.28) (1.30)
familyA -0.600∗∗ -0.721∗∗ -0.771∗∗ -0.726∗∗
(-2.42) (-2.35) (-2.28) (-2.30)
familyB 0.961∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(2.78) (2.78) (2.60) (2.60)
socialA -0.263 -0.363 -0.304 -0.270
(-0.88) (-1.02) (-0.79) (-0.75)
socialB -0.544∗ -0.604∗ -0.689∗ -0.663∗
(-1.84) (-1.74) (-1.84) (-1.88)
cons 8.576∗∗∗ 6.933∗∗∗ 10.11∗∗∗ 9.963∗∗∗
(6.33) (4.32) (5.71) (6.01)
N 2684 2684 2684 2684
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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allocations for comparing periods 1 and 2 versus periods 1 and 3 or periods 2
and 3 are effectively the same, which suggests that in aggregate, subjects do not
respond differently to different time periods, at least in our reduced form analysis.
There are a number of possible explanations for this: first, subjects are paying
much more attention to the exchange rate than to the time periods - we do see
that the exchange rate and initial allocation are significant. Second, subjects
could only be thinking about “sooner” versus “later”, effectively viewing all
comparisons as between the same two periods. This attitude would completely hide
time preferences from this reduced form analysis. Note, however, that structural
analysis, by allowing for curvature of utility, would be able to identify time
preference parameters from this data.
We find that most of the coefficients on outside effort are not significant -
subjects do not seem to take into account their outside time commitments when
allocating questions. However, the time commitments data is very noisy - subjects
were not incentivized to answer correctly, and many gave unrealistic answers.
Also, many subjects were not confident in their commitments, especially for dates
a month in the future. In an attempt to reduce bias, we re-run the Interval2
regression with various sample restrictions: Realistic includes only subjects who
listed fewer than 24 hours of commitments on each date, Confident only includes
subjects in the upper third of rated confidence in responses, and RealConf applies
both restrictions. Table 2 shows these results. Given these restrictions, a few of
the outside effort coefficients become significant, suggesting measurement error was
a problem in the first regression, and that some of these outside commitments do
make a small difference in decision-making.
Using our reduced form results, we can also investigate how demographics
affect allocations. Table 3 shows the results for a number of demographic
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TABLE 2. Sample Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FullSample Realistic Confident RealConf
Exchange -8.588∗∗∗ -9.013∗∗∗ -8.850∗∗∗ -9.311∗∗∗
(-8.47) (-8.08) (-5.76) (-5.72)
Endowment 0.517∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(16.35) (14.33) (11.40) (10.59)
Present -0.0386 0.0461 -0.641 -0.915
(-0.06) (0.06) (-0.66) (-0.90)
Weeks 0.0408 0.0408 0.854∗ 0.790
(0.15) (0.12) (1.93) (1.62)
assignA 0.672 0.491 1.513∗∗ 2.000∗∗
(1.62) (0.84) (2.33) (2.39)
assignB 0.338 0.877∗ -0.143 -0.356
(0.89) (1.75) (-0.22) (-0.47)
workA -0.741 -0.721 -1.319∗ -1.434∗
(-1.39) (-0.97) (-1.76) (-1.82)
workB 0.686 0.394 1.124 1.175
(1.30) (0.51) (1.63) (1.50)
familyA -0.726∗∗ -0.684 0.0722 0.191
(-2.30) (-1.53) (0.14) (0.28)
familyB 1.160∗∗∗ 1.501∗∗ 0.952∗ 1.076
(2.60) (2.52) (1.65) (1.47)
socialA -0.270 -0.621 -0.895∗ -0.893
(-0.75) (-1.33) (-1.67) (-1.26)
socialB -0.663∗ -0.414 0.111 0.215
(-1.88) (-0.83) (0.18) (0.27)
cons 9.963∗∗∗ 7.976∗∗∗ 6.349∗∗ 4.572
(6.01) (3.41) (2.55) (1.46)
N 2684 2205 1143 999
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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categories; this includes controls for all variables seen in Table 1. An interesting
pattern is that as students get older, they seem to put off tasks more - this could
be from increased burnout leading to increased procrastination, or increased
sophistication and self-trust, leading to less preproperation. There has been
significant speculation that Chinese language speakers may exhibit different time
preferences from English speakers, as their languages deals with time and tense
very differently, but we find no difference between them. Other language differences
are driven by small sample sizes.
Table 4 shows whether survey questions about real-life general and specific
behaviors are related the number of questions subjects allocate to the first period.
These questions were all asked after allocation decisions had been made, so
there was no chance of subjects keeping these questions in mind while answering
questions. Note that the first seven survey questions are measured on a 5-point
Likert scale, with 5 as the “Strongly agree”. The final four behavior questions are
binary yes/no questions. Most of the survey questions are insignificant, but the
survey question “I often have a task finished sooner than necessary” does indicate
that subjects complete more questions sooner (note the asterisk indicates a reversal
of the variable, so all coefficients would be expected to be positive). The behavior
questions are more significant; students who carry credit card debt complete fewer
questions sooner. Interestingly, students who sometimes pull “all-nighters” actually
complete more questions sooner, which suggests they are aware of their tendency to
procrastinate and want to overcome it.
One measurable real-life behavior we have is on which day subjects chose to
complete the experiment: in order to make it more academically friendly, subjects
could choose which day of the week was best for them, and complete the survey
on that week. Table 5 shows the differences between subjects who completed it on
55
TABLE 3. Demographics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS3 Tobit3 Interval3 IntervalNew3
Female 1.259 1.331 1.270 1.259
(1.33) (1.22) (1.08) (1.14)
Other 5.956 7.558 8.748 7.929
(1.28) (1.32) (1.25) (1.22)
Sophomore -2.715∗∗∗ -3.370∗∗∗ -3.550∗∗∗ -3.275∗∗∗
(-2.61) (-2.76) (-2.75) (-2.70)
Junior -1.809 -1.968 -2.310 -2.226
(-1.20) (-1.14) (-1.20) (-1.24)
Senior -5.382∗∗ -6.397∗∗ -6.720∗∗ -6.287∗∗
(-2.25) (-2.26) (-2.30) (-2.30)
Journalism 2.371 2.715 2.866 2.758
(1.22) (1.22) (1.18) (1.20)
SocialScience -0.399 -0.560 -0.782 -0.650
(-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.32) (-0.28)
Other 2.490 2.743 2.843 2.751
(1.47) (1.43) (1.36) (1.39)
Chinese -0.607 -0.798 -0.807 -0.736
(-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-0.52)
Arabic 3.683 4.126 4.369 4.166
(1.24) (1.18) (1.17) (1.19)
Other -2.902∗∗ -3.085∗ -3.535∗∗ -3.393∗∗
(-2.01) (-1.86) (-1.97) (-2.02)
Constant 7.211∗∗∗ 5.500∗∗ 8.804∗∗∗ 8.643∗∗∗
(3.28) (2.19) (3.25) (3.37)
All Controls yes yes yes yes
N 2619 2619 2619 2619
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE 4. Behaviors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS2 Tobit2 Interval2 IntervalNew2
Delay 0.326 0.370 0.374 0.358
(0.59) (0.56) (0.52) (0.54)
Unexpected 0.0980 0.0861 0.0881 0.0936
(0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
Schedule* -0.108 -0.188 -0.157 -0.130
(-0.19) (-0.28) (-0.22) (-0.20)
Sooner* 1.317∗∗ 1.562∗∗ 1.492∗ 1.409∗
(2.00) (2.00) (1.76) (1.78)
Accomplish* 0.333 0.342 0.556 0.503
(0.53) (0.46) (0.69) (0.67)
Control 0.656 0.711 0.811 0.764
(1.00) (0.92) (0.96) (0.97)
Comfortable 0.0959 0.139 0.184 0.157
(0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.21)
CreditCard* -2.032∗∗ -2.448∗∗ -2.553∗∗ -2.386∗∗
(-2.20) (-2.26) (-2.17) (-2.16)
Bank* -0.216 -0.0958 -0.171 -0.194
(-0.16) (-0.06) (-0.10) (-0.12)
AllNighter* 2.532∗∗ 2.991∗∗ 3.289∗∗ 3.071∗∗
(2.46) (2.45) (2.47) (2.47)
Late* -1.663 -1.749 -2.294 -2.148
(-1.42) (-1.31) (-1.64) (-1.62)
Constant 1.672 -0.759 1.485 1.853
(0.42) (-0.16) (0.30) (0.40)
All Controls yes yes yes yes
N 2628 2628 2628 2628
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE 5. Day of the Week
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WeekOLS WeekTobit WeekInterval WeekInterval2
Sunday 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Monday 1.634 1.873 2.092 1.976
(0.71) (0.68) (0.69) (0.70)
Tuesday -1.725 -1.987 -2.212 -2.057
(-1.00) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-0.98)
Wednesday -1.023 -1.356 -1.727 -1.482
(-0.58) (-0.65) (-0.78) (-0.71)
Thursday -0.634 -0.878 -1.161 -1.005
(-0.35) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.45)
Friday -5.864∗∗∗ -6.664∗∗∗ -7.333∗∗∗ -6.888∗∗∗
(-2.96) (-2.90) (-2.97) (-2.96)
Saturday -7.157∗∗∗ -8.396∗∗∗ -9.062∗∗∗ -8.443∗∗∗
(-4.52) (-4.40) (-4.29) (-4.31)
Late -0.818 -1.338 -1.839 -1.522
(-0.39) (-0.55) (-0.67) (-0.59)
All Controls
N 2684 2684 2684 2684
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
days of the week. Not surprisingly, subjects who put off completing the experiment
until Friday or Saturday choose to do a great deal fewer questions in early time
periods. In fact, these subjects may be more representative of a typical effort
allocation decision-maker, who didn’t specifically plan on making decisions on that
particular day.
Overall, our reduced form results suggest that subjects respond more to
differences in exchange rates, rather than differences in time. However, the
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TABLE 6. Question Statistics
Week 6 Week 8 Week 10
Correct Answers 71.7% 74.0% 71.1%
Completed Questions 98.1% 79.7% 78.2%
Total Credit 71.7% 59.0% 55.6%
structure of these regressions only allows comparison between different allocations,
rather than the results of individual allocations - subjects who put off questions in
every allocation cannot drive estimates of the coefficients on time.
Also, our results do not account for the possibility of different perceived costs
and benefits of questions in different time periods. It is possible that subjects
anticipate that they may forget class material, making questions more difficult in
future periods, or that they have a smaller likelihood of remembering to complete
them. Aggregate results show such fears about forgetting may be appropriate.
Table 6 shows the percentage of questions attempted and correctly answered
in each time period: while the percentage of answers that were correct didn’t
appreciably change between time periods, many more questions were forgotten in
the later time periods. It is possible that students anticipated this, but we cannot
control for this in the reduced form. Using structural analysis, however, allows us
to potentially control for different perceived cost in different time periods, and to
use information within each decisions, rather than only between comparisons.
Given the imperfect follow-through of students, it may be possible that
instead of expressing their true time preferences in this experiment, some subjects
are attempting to use this experiment as a commitment device, forcing themselves
to complete tasks sooner than they might otherwise prefer. The structure of the
experiment makes this very possible: subjects knew exactly what they were getting
into in the experiment (which was necessary given the academic environment),
and thus were likely thinking of these decisions in a more “rational”, long-term
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mindset than in other experiments on time preferences. This finding suggests that
the conditions of time preference experiments can affect the results.
Structural Results
Given our utility assumptions, the following equation describes the optimal
number of tasks to complete, when subjects are minimizing disutility of effort. In
this estimation, we restrict α > 1, because this implies interior solutions to the
budget decisions, which make up a large majority of observations.
xt =
(mP2 + ωt+k)(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1)
(1 + P1P2(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1))
− ωt
(1 + P1P2(
γt+kP1
γtP2
)
1
(α−1))
(3.12)
ωt = λt +
n∑
i=1
θi ∗ ηi (3.13)
Table 7 shows the results from estimating this equation using Nonlinear
Least Squares estimation. Future work will investigate and implement the use of
interval regressions for nonlinear applications; there is no pre-packaged tool for this.
Different columns include different assumptions about the structure of λ: columns
1 and 3 assume λ is constant across time periods, while column 2 allows λ to vary
between the three different time periods that appeared in the experiment. Column
3 also includes multiplicative scaling of questions in periods 2 and 3: each week
scales up the effort cost of questions by multiplier.
60
TABLE 7. NLS Structural Results
(1) (2) (3)
Default ChangingBaseline Multiplicative
beta 1.044∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.0539) (0.0916)
delta 0.723∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗
(0.0473) (0.0302) (0.0281)
Alpha 1.969∗∗∗ 1.271∗∗∗ 1.555∗∗∗
(0.376) (0.108) (0.195)
lambda1 -32.52∗∗∗ -29.59∗∗∗ -30.58∗∗∗
(2.451) (1.503) (1.863)
lambda2 -27.87∗∗∗
(1.599)
lambda3 -20.98∗∗∗
(1.666)
multiplier 0.0967∗∗∗
(0.0200)
work 0.140 -0.0228 0.0819
(0.548) (0.411) (0.495)
assign -1.390∗ -1.279∗∗ -1.350∗∗
(0.552) (0.459) (0.519)
family 0.199 0.0159 0.104
(0.458) (0.362) (0.423)
social 0.503 0.499 0.515
(0.461) (0.412) (0.441)
N 2684 2684 2684
adj. R2 0.860 0.861 0.861
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
61
Of the categories of outside effort, only time spent on assignments is
significant, and the coefficient is negative, suggesting subjects either substitute from
assignment time toward review questions, or already anticipate spending time on
review questions and count that as assignment time. However, we are using the full
sample, which includes many patently unrealistic responses of outside effort (like
more than 24 hours in a day), or responses that subjects were not confident about,
suggesting they may not reflect reality. A more accurate measure of outside effort
may present different results.
Given the qualitative results which seem to indicate completing tasks sooner
than necessary, it is slightly surprising to see values of β and δ that generally
align with previous literature. When we control for different costs of effort across
different time periods, we find that β equals about .6, statistically different from 1,
which is lower than other studies have found. (δ is not statistically different from 1
under those specifications.) This shows that our results may not actually be driven
by “preproperation”, but instead by different mental accounting of questions in
different time periods.
One of the most striking results from this estimation is that λ appears
negative, usually around -30. This suggests that subjects are prepared to complete
30 questions in any particular time period, and only begin to (expect to) feel
disutility after the first 30 questions. Interpreting this results for when subjects
allocate fewer than 30 questions to a day is difficult - our utility function isn’t
even defined for negative values of ω + x, except for very specific values of α.
Unfortunately, constraining λ to be positive in regressions creates non-convergence.
Future work will determine the significance and accuracy of the finding of
λ < 0, as well as investigating the alternative perspective of increasing effort being
coded as leisure loss.
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Loss of Leisure Specification
An alternative perspective to take on this whole subject is to view assigned
questions as losses of leisure, instead of increased cost. Given this perspective, with
diminishing marginal (positive) utility of leisure implying interior solutions instead
of increasing marginal costs of effort (so we restrict α < 1 instead of α > 1), we find
some very interesting results. Here, endowed effort appears positive (λ > 0), but
its scale implies negative leisure for many observed numbers of questions. Table 8
shows results from this estimation.
Interestingly, given the losses treatment, we actually find significant
evidence of “preproperation” - β is significantly greater than 1, which suggests
subjects weigh future leisure with more weight than present leisure. This result
is dramatically different than both our other perspective, and previous studies.
The fact that we find stable results with dramatically different estimates for two
different treatments suggests other published results may depend dramatically on
the perspective taken about effort.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This experiment on the discounting of effort over time finds little evidence
of strong discounting behavior. While subjects choices are quite responsive to
differences in the exchange rate between doing questions now rather than later,
they are much less responsive to changes in the time delay. Some kinds of outside
effort and commitments, as measured by self-reports, affect when subjects want
to do the questions, but the coefficients are small. Results from a structural
estimation with specific functional forms for utility and discounting vary depending
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TABLE 8. Losses Perspective
(1) (2) (3)
Default2 ChangingBaseline2 Multiplicative2
work 0.233 0.139 0.109
(0.530) (0.499) (0.406)
assign 0.632 0.589 0.686∗
(0.430) (0.412) (0.386)
classtime -0.378 -0.422 -0.330
(0.385) (0.360) (0.309)
study 0.0453 0.0727 0.0324
(0.342) (0.338) (0.309)
clubs 0.425 0.472 0.324
(0.499) (0.489) (0.445)
family 1.333∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗
(0.479) (0.470) (0.429)
social -0.788∗ -0.696∗ -0.893∗∗
(0.414) (0.404) (0.388)
beta 1.114∗∗∗ 1.406∗∗∗ 1.505∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.272) (0.458)
delta 0.829∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗
(0.0428) (0.0628) (0.143)
Alpha 0.136 0.328 0.301
(0.369) (0.318) (0.207)
Lambda 18.35∗∗∗ 22.12∗∗∗ 17.97∗∗∗
(2.807) (2.554) (1.661)
lambda8 19.05∗∗∗
(2.732)
lambda10 19.53∗∗∗
(2.174)
multiplier -0.0715∗∗∗
(0.0226)
Observations 2684 2684 2684
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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on the assumptions about mental accounting of effort - is it a loss of the good of
leisure, or an increase in the bad of effort?
One possible explanation for these mixed results, which was not considered
in the design, is that some subjects may have been using the experiment as a
commitment device (which sometimes failed), and that the estimates are therefore
a mix of preferences and efforts to commit to choices for which preferences may
change over time. This may explain some coefficient and parameter estimates, and
aligns with some subjects’ failure to follow through with their allocations choices.
Therefore, while our results for time preferences significantly differ from the most
related work, Augenblick et al. (2015) and Augenblick and Rabin (aper), this may
be due to differences in the circumstances surrounding the experiment.
This work shows that the design and framing of time allocation experiments
can make a large difference in how subjects treat the experiment. When subjects
are given significant warning and preparation time about real-effort tasks, they
make very different decisions than if they enter with few expectations. Running
an experiment in an academic setting limited our ability to suppress subjects’
expectations, and thus our ability to truly elicit time preferences. Work in similar
academic settings (such as Burger et al. (2011)) was not limited by the use
of graded credit as a motivation, but found similar behavior in attempting to
implement self-control.
We have also shown that the amount of effort, outside the experiment, that
subjects expected to have to do is worth considering when investigating time
allocation decisions. Previous work has either ignored this, or dismissed it as a
confound that cannot be investigated. In future work I will investigate the decision-
making of individuals and heterogeneity in their decisions.
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While mental accounting of money has been extensively studied (especially
through Prospect Theory), significantly less research has investigated mental
accounting of effort. Effort can be framed as an increase in a bad, or as a loss
of a good, i.e. leisure. Many researchers have found differences between mental
accounting of losses versus gains for money (including Estle et al. (2006) and
Appelt et al. (2011)), so finding similar results for effort is not surprising. Future
planned experiments will investigate the application of Prospect Theory and mental
accounting to effort versus leisure, and compare that to preferences over money.
In conclusion, this experiment has shown that experimentally elicited time
preferences for effort are not the same as the time preferences of money that are
typically found in experiments. Additionally, while outside effort as measured
by our elicitation method did not often show up as statistically or economically
significant, among some samples of subjects it may make a difference and is worth
increased investigation in the future.
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CHAPTER IV
RISK PREFERENCES FOR REAL EFFORT TASKS
Risk preferences are fundamental to any model of economic behavior. While
risk preferences, specifically utility curvature and probability weighting, have been
extensively studied for money, very little empirical research has been completed
on risk preferences for things other than money. We complete an experiment with
two separate sessions: one which elicits risk preferences for money, the other which
elicits risk preferences for leisure and effort, defined as the quantity of real-effort
tasks to complete. In aggregate, subjects were more risk-neutral over the quantity
of leisure compared to money (less risk-averse over gains, less risk-seeking over
losses). Individual risk preferences for money versus leisure were not correlated,
suggesting individuals have many perspectives in evaluating risk.
4.1 Introduction
Real-effort tasks are becoming more and more popular in economics
experiments, as a way to induce disutility in subjects, to measure time preferences,
to promote a sense of ownership of payoffs, and many other possibilities. However,
there is only a limited understanding of the relationship between these tasks
and (dis)utility, especially when connected to risk. Specifically, we don’t know
the connection between risk preferences for effort and leisure versus the more
well-studied risk preferences for money. Individuals could have consistent risk
preferences across various domains, being risk-averse or risk-seeking for many
different outcomes, or these preferences could be independent within individuals.
If risk preferences are consistent across domains, then research insights gained from
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studying decisions over money can be generalized to other outcomes. However,
if there is little connection between preferences over different domains, then we
cannot carry over previous results into different domains, and further research is
necessary. Specifically, if we continue to use real-effort tasks in experiments, we
as economists need to better understand the utility and preferences behind these
real-effort tasks, instead of assuming they are comparable with money.
In a novel experimental treatment that elicited risk preferences for both
money and leisure/effort across two different sessions, we find that these preferences
are independent - while similar on an aggregate level, decisions over money and
decisions over leisure are correlated with different covariates, and at an individual
level only slightly correlated with each other. We conclude that economists need
to study risk preferences in domains other than money, and not assume equal risk
preferences when comparing outcomes in different domains, such as money versus
time or health or direct consumption.
Section 2 presents a literature review of the basics of risk and real-effort tasks;
section 3 describes the experiment, including two separate sessions: one for money,
and one for effort. Section 4 shows the utility model and empirical strategies used
in estimation, section 5 presents the aggregate results of those estimations, while
section 6 includes results of individual estimations and their connections. Section 6
concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Like countless other papers before it, this experiment aims to estimate risk
attitudes of individuals. Risk is fundamental to nearly all fields of economics, and
knowing how individuals regard risk has been a considerable goal throughout much
of the history of experimental economics. Yet few have analyzed risk preferences as
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they relate to anything other than money, including consumption goods, leisure, or
in our case, real-effort tasks. In this paper, we extend the literature by looking at
the influence of real-effort tasks on risk preferences.
Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) reviews a wide range of elicitation and
estimation methods for risk attitudes, including many common but imprecise
techniques, and others with more economic precision. One approach is the Multiple
Price List (MPL), popularized by Holt and Laury (2002), which has been used
in many other successful contexts (including Harrison et al. (2007)). Another
technique is a simple lottery comparison method known as Random Lottery
Pairs (RLP) originated by Hey and Orme (1994) and used in many applications,
including Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009), where subjects are shown two lotteries
and have to choose between them, with no systematic presentation. While the
lottery comparison technique does not allow as much precision in calculating
the parameters of risk preferences, it allows a wider variety of comparisons,
including comparisons using more than two outcomes, and a broader range of
estimation techniques. It is also very transparent and easy for experimental
subjects to understand. For these reasons, and for comparing results with previous
experiments, we use the lottery comparison technique.
The dominant theory of decision-making under risk has been Expected Utility
Theory. However, there are many known deficiencies in this theory: specifically,
observable behavior that cannot be explained by this theory, such as the Allais
paradox. Many attempts have been made to explain apparent anomalies in risk
preferences and deviations from expected utility theory, including prospect theory
with loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman
(1991)) and probability weighting (Prelec and Loewenstein (1998)). These predict a
four-fold pattern of risk seeking and aversion over small and large probability gains
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and losses: see Harbaugh et al. (2002) and Harbaugh et al. (2010) for a discussion
of this pattern. Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009) discusses some of these approaches,
finding that given their experimental results, a mixture of expected utility and
prospect theory best describes observed choices. We aim to investigate whether
this four-fold pattern applies to both money and effort.
Real-effort tasks, on the other hand, occur sporadically throughout the
literature in various topics, including related to time preferences (Augenblick et al.
(2015)), procrastination (Bisin and Hyndman (2014a)), and especially competition
(examples include Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Dreber et al. (2014)). There
is an even larger literature of effort allocation without real-effort tasks, especially
in competition, where subjects pick a number to plug into a cost function (such as
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005)), but real-effort tasks are a completely different
domain in a subject’s decision-making, and thus results from these studies are
not very useful in identifying separate risk preferences. While some real-effort
tasks (like mathematical problems often used in competition studies) demonstrate
significant differences in skill and willingness to compete by demographics, studies
investigating the effects of real-effort tasks usually use tasks with little to no skill or
learning effects, little variation in difficulty between subjects, and which provide no
obvious benefit to anyone. A prime example of this is the digit-counting task from
Abeler et al. (2011), which we use in our experiment.
Abeler et al. (2011) in fact is one of the few papers that deals with effort
given risky rewards. While they introduce a theoretical framework regarding cost
of effort and utility maximization, they do not attempt to calculate cost of effort
and thus the degree of risk aversion in subjects. On the other hand, Gill and
Prowse (2012) does calculate the cost of effort, but assumes it takes quadratic
form, and because the given experiment involves competition, the probabilities
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that subjects face are not explicit, making calculation of risk aversion difficult.
Similarly, in Carpenter et al. (2007), subjects make real-effort allocation decisions
in a competitive environment, and costs of effort are calculated, but with restrictive
assumptions and unknown probabilities of outcomes.
Different risk preferences in different domains have received some attention;
outside of economics, the DOSPERT (DOmain-SPEcific Risk Taking) survey
(Blais and Weber (2006)) attempts to measure five categories of risk-taking and
perceptions, but is limited by being only a survey. Within economics, differences
in risk preferences for the domains of losses versus gains is one of the primary
components of prospect theory, and many have performed experiments investigating
this (including Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009)). However, in the domain of effort
and leisure, labeling losses and gains is not as easy as positive or negative numbers:
a positive number of additional tasks to complete is a loss of leisure, which we
assume is a good. Most research using real-effort tasks (including Abeler et al.
(2011) and Augenblick et al. (2015)) analyze only the disutility of additional effort,
not the gained utility from increased leisure. While we use both approaches in our
analysis, we prefer the perspective of leisure, which as positive good is more directly
comparable to money.
4.3 Experimental Design
Subjects were recruited from sections of introductory classes in economics,
with no formal introduction to risk preferences (although they were likely to
have seen mathematical calculations of expected value). Subjects signed up for
two different experiment sessions, one session with payoffs of real-effort tasks to
complete, the other with outcomes of monetary payoffs, without knowing which
session was which beforehand. The two sessions were 1-3 weeks apart, depending on
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individual schedules. Sessions consisted of up to 12 individuals (mean subjects per
session = 6.1). Each session, completed using the z-Tree software (from Fischbacher
(2007)) included presentations of both gains and losses. For money, gains were
labeled as earning additional money from a $0 baseline, while losses were labeled as
losing money from a $50 baseline. For the leisure gains/effort loss frame, subjects
were instructed that they would be completing 25 real-effort tasks at the end of
the experiment, and lotteries entered were for relief from these 25 tasks - subjects
would gain leisure from having to complete fewer tasks. In the leisure loss/effort
gain frame for the real-effort tasks sessions, the default was zero tasks completed,
and lotteries were over having to complete additional tasks. Sections were randomly
assigned to begin with either the gains or losses frame, and switch to the other
frame halfway through the experiment.
The real-effort task involved in this research was taken from Abeler et al.
(2011): subjects were shown an image of a 15x15 matrix of digits (225 total digits),
consisting only of 0s and 1s. They had to count the total number of 0s appearing
in the matrix and input this total number. If they inputted the correct answer or
a number within two of the correct answer, the task was completed; if wrong, they
had one more chance. If wrong again, the task counted as a negative completion
and they were shown a new table - this was to discourage random guessing. See
Figure 5 for an example. This was designed to be boring, taxing concentration,
and with obviously no outside benefit to anyone, thus giving us a task all subjects
would try to avoid. There was also only a small possibility that subjects would
substantially improve in their ability to complete this task over the time period
of this experiment, although some subjects developed new techniques for digit-
counting and did marginally improve their speed.
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FIGURE 5. Real Effort Task
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In the sessions involving effort, subjects first completed as many tasks as they
could in five minutes while paid a piece rate for these tasks; this simultaneously
informed them of the difficulty and effort required in the task, their ability to
complete these tasks, and set a baseline of the task completion rate for each
subject. Once they were sufficiently familiar with these tasks, subjects were shown
60 comparisons of lotteries through z-Tree software in two sets of 30 comparisons,
and had to choose which one they would prefer to enter. The lotteries had possible
outcomes of 5, 10, 15, and 20 tasks to complete, although each lottery comparison
only included three possible prizes. Probabilities were in multiples of 1/8, including
a few degenerate lotteries with certain payoffs. Comparisons were presented as two
pie charts, accompanied by tables of outcomes and probabilities.
The first and second sets of 30 comparisons were in opposite framings -
one was shown as additional tasks to complete, the other as relief from 25 tasks.
Before each of these sets of comparisons, subjects took a short comprehension
quiz, both to make sure subjects understood the experiment and to preview the
different framings. Figure 6 shows the same lottery comparison, presented in
the two different framings. Notice that we use a different color palette for each
framing, to minimize association in decision-making between the two frames. After
answering demographic questions and a short numeracy quiz, one of the 60 lottery
comparisons was randomly chosen to apply to each subject. Then, the lottery
that the subject selected from that comparison was resolved, and subjects were
assigned a number of tasks to complete. At the end of the experiment, subjects had
to complete however many real-effort tasks they were assigned. As soon as they
finished, they collected their payments (a show-up fee and a lump sum payment
for completing tasks) and were free to leave. Subjects could leave early before
completing all of their assigned tasks, but were not given the completion payment
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(only two subjects left early, after making an effort to complete their tasks).
Note that the number of tasks assigned did not affect the size of the completion
payment. Therefore, there was no benefit to having more tasks to complete, making
number of tasks to complete (which we label as effort) a pure “bad”, and being
relieved of tasks (labeled leisure) a pure good.
In the sessions involving money, subjects also had to complete 60 total
comparisons, in two rounds of 30 comparisons each, with outcomes of $10, $20, $30,
and $40. Again, one of the rounds was presented as gains, this time as additional
money, while the other was framed as losses from a baseline of $50, with the order
of the framings varying by session. Figure 7 shows the two framings of money
comparisons. In both the money and effort sessions, subjects had eight minutes to
complete each round of 30 comparisons, and could not move on in the experiment
until the eight minutes were over. Therefore, there was no benefit to subjects
completing comparisons faster than the given eight minutes. (There were penalties
for not completing comparisons in 8 minutes that never had to be applied). After
completing all of the comparisons, subjects completed a demographic survey, the
DOSPERT assessment of risk attitudes, and a personality test. Once all students
had completed all assessments, one of the 60 comparisons was chosen for each
student, then the chosen lottery of that comparison was resolved, and subjects were
paid in cash and dismissed.
Sessions occurred in January-March 2016, with subjects recruited from intro-
level sections of economics courses. We collected data from 89 total subjects in
sessions over money and 92 subjects in effort. Of those subjects, 79 completed both
sessions: our analysis only uses these 79 subjects.
Demographics of the 79 subject sample are shown in Table 9. Note that there
were slight discrepancies in reported major and class year between the two sessions
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FIGURE 6. Effort Comparisons
76
FIGURE 7. Money Comparisons
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TABLE 9. Demographics
freq pct
Male 46 58.23
Female 33 41.77
Economics 13 16.46
Business 42 53.16
Journalism 10 12.66
Social Science 7 8.86
Natural Science 2 2.53
Other 5 6.33
English 65 82.28
Chinese 8 10.13
Other 6 7.59
Freshman 39 49.37
Sophomore 22 27.85
Junior 10 12.66
Senior 6 7.59
N 79
(and two missing class years); we use reported demographics from the money
session.
4.4 Test Strategy
Within each comparison, we assume that subjects select the lottery with the
greater utility. We have multiple models of utility, all applicable to money and
effort/leisure.
The first model is a simple Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function,
where utility is evaluated based on final outcomes, not subject to framing effects:
u(x) =
(xα)− 1
α
In this model, α is the curvature of utility, and our measure of risk aversion.
Other papers replace α with 1 − ρ as a convention, but for familiarity, we use
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α. Subjects are risk-averse when α < 1, risk-neutral when α = 1, and risk-
seeking when α > 1. However, this basic model assumes that the utility of gaining
$30 (compared to gaining $0) is the same as losing $20 from a baseline of $50
(compared to losing all $50), which is not consistent with observed behavior.
The other model of utility, based on Prospect Theory, assumes a different
utility curvature for losses. Here, outcomes are in comparison to a reference point,
and thus subject to framing effects:
u(x) =

(xα)− 1
α if x ≥ 0
−(−x
β)− 1
β
if x < 0
Including both α and β is described as the two-parameter model.
For gains, risk aversion and risk seeking are again marked by α < 1 and
α > 1, respectively. However, β marks the curvature of a negative function, and
thus β < 1 denotes risk-seeking and β > 1 shows risk aversion. While α < 1
means that low-probability large gains are less attractive than they would be under
risk neutrality and thus not worth seeking out, β < 1 means low-probability large
losses are not as prohibitive as they would be under risk neutrality, and thus not
worth avoiding. Previous experiments in Prospect Theory included in the literature
review have found α < 1 and β < 1 - subjects are risk-averse in gains, and risk-
seeking in losses.
Note that we do not include utility from the reference point (either $50 or 25
tasks) in these utility functions. Because we are generally assuming that decisions
are based on utility differences of the two lotteries in the comparison, any term that
is equal between the two lotteries would be canceled out by taking the difference.
Therefore, reference-point utility is canceled out, and we cannot estimate it.
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Traditionally, Prospect Theory includes a scaling term of λ applied to losses,
which reflects that the disutility of losses is greater in magnitude than the utility of
same-sized gains - that is, a kink in the value function at zero. However, because
our experiment never includes comparisons of gains against losses (only gains
against gains and losses against losses), our data cannot identify a λ term, so we
do not include it in our utility model.
We can think of an increase in the number of tasks to complete as either an
increase in a bad (effort) or a decrease of a good (leisure). Similarly, a decrease
in tasks can be a decrease of effort or an increase in leisure. Because we primarily
focus on utility of goods, rather than disutility of bads, we emphasize preferences
for leisure instead of effort in our analysis. But in utility frameworks with gains and
losses, α for leisure is the same as β for effort.
Both α and β can vary based on many different covariates. We will test
whether they depend on demographics, differences in experimental procedure,
risk attitudes as measured by the DOSPERT assessment, and measured Big 5
personality traits.
Subjects also have utilities of the lottery as a whole, as determined by the
utilities of the possible outcomes and the probabilities of those outcomes. We have
two models for this aggregation of utility. First is simple expected utility, where
outcome utilities are weighted by their true probabilities (denoted p(x) for each
outcome x):
U =
4∑
i=1
p(xi) ∗ u(xi)
Prospect Theory also introduces the possibility of probability weighting:
subjects act as if they misperceive probabilities and use them to underweight or
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overweight particular outcomes. We assume this weighting takes place through a
function w(p(x)), where p(x) is the probabilities as before.
U =
4∑
i=1
w(p(xi)) ∗ u(xi)
The probability weighting function could have many possible functional forms,
but we focus on the original functional form proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1992):
w(pk) = p
γ
k/(
4∑
i=1
pγi )
1/γ
In this functional form, a single parameter γ determines the weighting of
probabilities. Note that when γ < 1, low probabilities are over-weighted and high
probabilities are under-weighted, while when γ > 1 the opposite is true. Most
previous research has found overweighting of small probabilities (γ < 1).
Including γ along with α and β is described as the three-parameter model.
We assume that individuals then compare the utility of the two lotteries in
the comparison, and select the lottery with higher utility. However, we assume
that there is an additive error term  in this decision-making process with a logistic
distribution with scale parameter σ, proportional to the standard deviation. So, the
estimated difference in utilities between lotteries A and B would be:
∆U = U(A)− U(B) + 
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The actual probability of selecting a lottery, given a difference in utilities,
follows the inverse logistic distribution. Consequently, the likelihood of observing
Left or Right given a particular utility function also follows the inverse logistic
function:
P (A) = exp(
(U(A)− U(B))
σ
)/(1 + exp((
(U(A)− U(B))
σ
)))
Some previous work has ignored the importance of the scale parameter of
the logistic distribution. Not including σ would assume that the error-generating
process has a scale of 1 in terms of absolute utility difference, a clearly overly-
strong assumption, considering the wide variety of scales we may see in utility.
Considering that gains and losses are different domains with differing levels
of familiarity and risk aversion, it is also possible that the error-generating process
is different for gains versus losses, in which case we would estimate two separate σ
parameters, one for gains and one for losses.
Given this likelihood function, we use Maximum Likelihood estimation on the
logarithm of this function. The parameters that result in the greatest likelihood
function are the best estimate of the true parameters of the model.
Another possible assumption about the decision rule and the error-generating
process is subjects compare ratios of utility (instead of absolute differences) which
have multiplicative instead of additive errors. In this case, assuming positive utility:
82
if

|U(A)|/|U(B)| ∗  > 1 → select A
|U(A)|/|U(B)| ∗  < 1 → select B
The decision rule would be the opposite for negatively-valued utility, such as
for losses of money.
Here,  has a log-logistic distribution, also known as the Fisk distribution
(such that log() has a logistic distribution) with median 1 and a scale parameter σ
(such that log() has median 0 and scale σ as well).
Now let us transform this decision-making process:
|U(A)|/|U(B)| ∗  R 1
log(|U(A)|)− log(|U(B)|) + log() R 0
We know log() has a logistic distribution from our previous assumptions.
This looks very much like our previous decision rule for additive errors. So, let us
similarly feed it into the inverse logistic function, for positive utility values:
P (A) = exp(
log(U(A))− log(U(B))
σ
)/(1 + exp((
log(U(A))− log(U(B))
σ
)))
P (A) = exp(log(U(A)))1/σ/(exp(log(U(A)))1/σ + exp(log(U(B)))1/σ)
P (A) =
U(A)1/σ
U(A)1/σ + U(B)1/σ
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This transformed probability is the scaled version of the Luce model (Luce
(1959)). The traditional Luce specification with no exponential term assumes σ =
1, as we saw before.
For negative utility values, the decision rule runs the opposite direction, so
the inverse logistic function gives probabilities of finding the alternative, and the
actual probability is:
P (A|U(A) < 0) = 1− |U(A)|
1/σ
|U(A)|1/σ + |U(B)|1/σ =
U(B)1/σ
U(A)1/σ + U(B)1/σ
We will estimate utility parameters given this assumption about the decision-
making and error-generating processes as well, and compare them to the results
from additive errors.
4.5 Aggregate Results
The goal of our estimation is to find risk preferences for real-effort tasks,
compared with risk preferences for money, for both gains and losses. We also
want to investigate the role of covariates, such as demographics and personality
traits, on those risk preferences. Finally, we wish to investigate the distribution
of risk preferences for money and real-effort tasks among the subject population,
and determine the relationship between risk preferences for money and effort in
subjects. In order to achieve these goals, we also need to determine the decision-
making process and accompanying error-generating process that best matches the
observed choice patterns.
To determine the most appropriate error-generating process to assume, we
take the two-parameter model (including α and β, but no γ) and run estimations
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under all four of our possible stochastic assumptions: additive logistic errors with
σ = 1 (as occurs in many previous papers), σ estimated, and two separate values
of σ estimated for gains and losses; also, multiplicative errors with σ estimated. We
then compare the predicted probabilities of choices under the model to the observed
distribution of choices in the data. Table 10 shows the true distributions of choices
for select lotteries in each domain (under Mean), and the distributions predicted
for those lotteries, given various error structures. It also shows the mean difference
in observed versus predicted distributions for all 60 lotteries (as Mean Abs. Error),
given the two-parameter model. From this, we observe that for money, the Luce
error structure performs slightly better than the σGain 6= σLoss model, both of which
are better than the other two models. For effort, σGain 6= σLoss is by far the best
model. Especially because of this much-improved performance in the effort domain,
we use the σGain 6= σLoss model throughout the rest of the analysis.
TABLE 10. Error Structure Assumptions
Money
Lottery EV Diff Mean σ = 1 σGain = σLoss σGain 6= σLoss Luce
4 -3.75 0.4304 0.1789 0.2493 0.2557 0.3042
17 0 0.3544 0.5021 0.4872 0.4289 0.4170
38 1.25 0.7342 0.6269 0.5850 0.5698 0.5906
50 1.75 0.4557 0.6296 0.5911 0.5671 0.5519
Mean Abs. Error 0.1074 0.1043 0.0966 0.0915
Effort
Lottery EV Diff Mean σ = 1 σGain = σLoss σGain 6= σLoss Luce
8 0 0.8228 0.4984 0.5021 0.6828 0.5239
15 -1.875 0.8228 0.7975 0.7729 0.8001 0.7863
25 1.875 0.1519 0.1991 0.2161 0.1916 0.2090
49 1.25 0.2308 0.2874 0.3235 0.3417 0.3158
Mean Abs. Error 0.1225 0.1201 0.0694 0.1144
Given this error structure, we estimate the baseline parameters of the utility
function in all three domains: money, effort, and leisure. First, money: Table
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TABLE 11. Parameter Estimates for Money
(1) (2) (3)
choicesmoney choicesmoney choicesmoney
alpha 0.435∗∗ 0.353 0.430
(0.167) (0.230) (0.278)
beta 1.367∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.208)
gamma 1.047∗∗∗
(0.0728)
sigmagain 0.441 0.391 0.522
(0.245) (0.298) (0.501)
sigmaloss 7.917 6.920
(4.965) (4.388)
N 4738 4738 4738
AIC 6025.8 6028.4 6028.6
ll -3010.9 -3010.2 -3009.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
11 shows parameter estimates for three different utility models: simple expected
utility, expected utility with loss aversion, and probability-weighted utility with loss
aversion. Standard errors in all regressions presented are clustered at the individual
level. Note that small coding errors caused a few subjects to miss a single lottery
comparison, so N is not divisible by 60.
These results show that in all models, subjects are significantly risk-averse
in the gains domain: α < 1. Subjects are also risk-averse in the losses domain:
β > 1. This finding of risk aversion in the losses domain runs counter to most
previous research, which finds risk-seeking in losses. However, notice the Akaiki
Information Criterion and the log-likelihood for each regression are very similar:
controlling for loss aversion added very little to the predictive power, and actually
caused an increase in the AIC. This shows that the difference in framing actually
made very little difference in decision-making for subjects, assuming the framing
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made losses induce negative utility. It is possible that instead of viewing losses as
producing negative utility, subjects still view results as gains of money, just in a
different domain and thus with a different risk aversion parameter. Table 14 shows
results of this specification (“losses” are still positive, but with a different risk
parameter) with the two-parameter for all three domains. But even though there
is little evidence for the two-parameter model in aggregate, there may be differences
in how outside factors affect these two parameters, so we continue to use this model
in subsequent analysis.
For the three-parameter model, we find γ very close to (and statistically
indistinguishable from) one, and with minimal gain in accuracy. We can conclude
that this experiment shows no evidence of probability weighting, and thus ignore
the three-parameter model for future estimation.
Table 12 shows estimates for of parameters in preferences for leisure in the
same three models as Table 11. First, we can dismiss the three-parameter model, as
γ is almost exactly equal to 1. However, here we find that subjects are extremely
risk-averse in both gains and losses of leisure: α is in a range characterized by
Holt and Laury (2002) as “stay in bed”, beyond “highly risk-averse”. Inspection
reveals that the main driver of this extreme risk aversion is avoiding the possibility
of completing 20 tasks. Also, separating gains and losses makes a considerable
improvement in estimation accuracy - there is a real difference in decisions over
gains versus over losses. Table 14 also shows results for leisure with separating
gains versus losses into two preference domains, instead of positive versus negative
outcomes.
As an alternative framing for leisure, we can look at disutility over the
number of tasks to complete, which we label as effort. Table 13 shows these
estimates. Here, utility over increases in effort is negative, while utility from
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TABLE 12. Parameter Estimates for Leisure
(1) (2) (3)
choicesleisure choicesleisure choicesleisure
alpha -0.783∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -1.310∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.319) (0.326)
beta 2.799∗∗∗ 2.796∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.396)
gamma 0.997∗∗∗
(0.0485)
sigmagain 0.0351∗∗ 0.00962 0.00964
(0.0131) (0.00533) (0.00542)
sigmaloss 272.8 270.7
(317.3) (318.4)
N 4722 4722 4722
AIC 5562.9 5491.6 5493.6
ll -2779.4 -2741.8 -2741.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
decreases in effort is positive. The two- and three-parameter models are just the
reverse of the models for leisure, and the parameter estimates reflect that: a loss of
leisure is identical to a gain of effort. Naturally, these estimates again show extreme
risk aversion.
Table 14 shows the effects of separating gains and losses, but not treating
losses as negative. Note that in this reframing, α and β for money are not
statistically significantly different: there is no strong evidence for any loss
aversion for money in our experiment. However, the regression is a better fit
than the previous two-parameter model, suggesting that effort and leisure do still
demonstrate a significant difference between gains and losses: subjects are more
risk-averse in increases in leisure/decreases in effort. Comparing the AIC of all
effort or leisure regressions, the best of all our specifications is the separated but
not reframed effort regression: the decision-making process that best aligns with
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TABLE 13. Parameter Estimates for Effort
(1) (2) (3)
choiceseffort choiceseffort choiceseffort
alpha 3.832∗∗∗ 2.799∗∗∗ 2.796∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.393) (0.396)
beta -1.311∗∗∗ -1.310∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.326)
gamma 0.997∗∗∗
(0.0485)
sigmagain 4042.1 272.8 270.7
(4303.0) (317.6) (318.4)
sigmaloss 0.00962 0.00964
(0.00533) (0.00543)
N 4722 4722 4722
AIC 5550.3 5491.6 5493.6
ll -2773.2 -2741.8 -2741.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
our data is that subjects minimize their disutility of effort, and do not view effort
“losses” as such, but instead an alternative way of presenting increases in effort.
A reasonable question is whether order effects made a difference. While
the order of the domains and of the framings was effectively randomized, it is
still possible that they made a difference, even though they would not affect our
aggregate estimates. Table 15 shows order effects: we find that subjects who
attended the effort session second were even more risk averse over leisure gains,
and subjects who saw money losses first before money gains were more risk-tolerant
of losses. These small differences are not too surprising, and again do not matter
for our aggregate results.
We also investigated if demographics made a difference in risk preferences.
Table 16 shows the effects of demographics on α and β in the two-parameter model
(framed) for both money and leisure. Generally, major, language, and class year
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TABLE 14. Separated Regressions, Not Reframed
(1) (2) (3)
choicesmoney choiceseffort choicesleisure
alpha 0.353 2.799∗∗∗ -1.041∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.392) (0.249)
beta 0.512∗∗ 4.802∗∗∗ 0.00762
(0.174) (0.498) (0.207)
sigmagain 0.391 272.9 0.0139∗
(0.298) (317.0) (0.00618)
sigmaloss 0.486 49588.6 0.179∗
(0.288) (73988.2) (0.0748)
N 4738 4722 4242
AIC 6017.9 5485.8 4729.0
ll -3005.0 -2738.9 -2360.5
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
do not affect measured risk preferences for gains or losses - most of the observed
significant coefficients are the result of small sample sizes for that demographic
group. We do find evidence that women are more risk-averse than men over money
gains and leisure losses. However, we find that they are actually more risk-tolerant
than men in leisure gains, and no different than men over money losses. Sex
differences in risk preferences are have been found in some experiments but not
others (see Harrison et al. (2007) for a small discussion), and may be the result
of other unobserved characteristics. Chinese-speaking students are more risk-
averse over money losses. Strangely, their preferences for leisure losses cannot
be effectively described - they appear to be so risk-seeking that it breaks the
estimation technique. This may be due to confusion about the task - scores for
Chinese-speaking students in the comprehension quizzes were significantly lower
than English-speaking students.
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TABLE 15. Order Effects
(1) (2)
choicesmoney choicesleisure
alpha
2.session 0.0133 -0.304∗
(0.0601) (0.146)
2.framing 0.0430 -0.193
(0.0677) (0.128)
Constant 0.339 -1.012∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.272)
beta
2.session -0.0624 -0.0702
(0.0640) (0.112)
2.framing -0.156∗ -0.0104
(0.0642) (0.104)
Constant 1.505∗∗∗ 2.759∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.407)
sigmagain 0.409 0.0111∗
(0.329) (0.00536)
sigmaloss 8.663 219.6
(5.229) (261.1)
N 4738 4722
AIC 6022.2 5458.1
ll -3003.1 -2721.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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TABLE 16. Demographic Covariates
(1) (2)
choicesmoney choicesleisure
alpha beta alpha beta
Female -0.161** -0.0373 0.253** 0.242*
-0.0574 -0.056 -0.0892 -0.109
Business 0.0163 0.00797 0.238 -0.0191
-0.107 -0.0808 -0.233 -0.161
Journalism -0.05 -0.203 0.376 -0.172
-0.168 -0.154 -0.228 -0.218
Social Science -0.0474 0.0294 0.272 0.337*
-0.166 -0.109 -0.241 -0.17
Natural Science 0.0635 0.301*** 0.425 0.107
-0.192 -0.0742 -0.255 -0.132
Other 0.0107 -0.148 0.0549 0.0191
-0.185 -0.211 -0.264 -0.208
Sophomore -0.0516 0.221** -0.0221 -0.0323
-0.085 -0.0725 -0.0971 -0.132
Junior 0.0756 -0.123 0.114 0.0174
-0.145 -0.106 -0.137 -0.181
Senior -0.0428 0.0146 -0.177 -0.0204
-0.137 -0.0947 -0.17 -0.145
Chinese 0.151 0.262** -0.901* -118.4
-0.112 -0.101 -0.407 (.)
Other 0.301*** -0.175 -1.461 -0.445
-0.0843 -0.101 -2.019 -0.272
numeracytotal 0.0613 0.107* 0.124** 0.0575
-0.0374 -0.0487 -0.0478 -0.0644
Constant 0.304 0.980** -1.742*** 2.320***
-0.339 -0.303 -0.381 -0.428
sigmagain 0.511 0.0101*
-0.485 -0.00482
sigmaloss 6.499 109.1
-3.803 -99.76
Observations 4738 4722
AIC 5986.1 5184.8
ll -2966.1 -2565.4
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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From the risk attitudes in different categories that we elicited with the
DOSPERT assessment (from Blais and Weber (2006)), we examine any connections
between estimated risk preferences in the lab and stated willingness to take various
risky actions. Subjects took the 30-question assessment, rating their likelihood
on a 7-point scale of taking various risky actions in five categories of risk: ethical,
financial, health, recreational, and social. For each subject, the total rating for each
category was added up, then normalized over all subjects, so the variables we use
are measured in standard deviations. Table 17 shows the estimates using these five
covariates. Note that this does not control for demographics - we are investigating
the effect of stated risk attitudes, not stated risk attitudes beyond those expected
from demographic differences.
We would expect attitudes toward financial risk to be correlated with risk
preferences for money, but do not find that - financial risk attitudes have no
significant effect. Generally, we find few significant correlations of measured risk
preferences with self-reported risk attitudes. Ethical risk tolerance corresponds with
risk aversion for leisure, and health risk tolerance with leisure risk tolerance, but
these are likely spurious.
Similarly, we investigate the connection between personality: normalized
scores from Goldberg’s 50-question Big Five assessment (Goldberg (1992)) and
estimated risk preferences. We have few strong priors here: while some personality
traits seem like they might be associated with risk tolerance or seeking (like
openness), the connection is not very clear. Table 18 shows the effects of these
covariates. Only two correlations out: increased conscientiousness means subjects
are more risk tolerant of leisure gains, and extraversion means risk tolerance for
leisure losses. Neither of these align with a priori expectations or narratives, and
may again be spurious.
93
TABLE 17. Risk Attitude Covariates
(1) (2)
choicesmoney choicesleisure
alpha beta alpha beta
ethicalrisk 0.0485 0.00230 -0.188∗∗ -0.112
(0.0328) (0.0262) (0.0672) (0.0819)
financialrisk 0.0403 -0.0285 -0.0736 -0.126
(0.0323) (0.0291) (0.0506) (0.0659)
healthrisk -0.0131 0.0592 0.167∗ 0.0402
(0.0392) (0.0417) (0.0826) (0.0741)
recreationalrisk 0.0369 0.0368 -0.0706 -0.0184
(0.0374) (0.0343) (0.0594) (0.0579)
socialrisk 0.0561 -0.0529 0.0782 0.0934
(0.0353) (0.0390) (0.0652) (0.0555)
Constant 0.462 1.353∗∗∗ -1.353∗∗∗ 2.582∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.237) (0.306) (0.372)
sigmagain 0.580 0.00843
(0.502) (0.00455)
sigmaloss 7.631 151.2
(5.454) (162.6)
N 4738 4722
AIC 6022.0 5309.6
ll -2997.0 -2640.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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TABLE 18. Personality Covariates
(1) (2)
choicesmoney choicesleisure
alpha beta alpha beta
agreeableness 0.00733 -0.0147 0.0858 0.0463
(0.0425) (0.0273) (0.0561) (0.0692)
extraversion -0.0167 0.0284 0.0546 -0.136∗
(0.0415) (0.0402) (0.0795) (0.0664)
conscienciousness -0.0530 0.0191 0.183∗∗ 0.00592
(0.0311) (0.0317) (0.0646) (0.0556)
stability -0.00289 0.0379 0.0513 0.0622
(0.0495) (0.0253) (0.0640) (0.0723)
openness 0.0251 0.00654 0.0832 0.154
(0.0503) (0.0403) (0.0729) (0.104)
Constant 0.355 1.359∗∗∗ -1.073∗∗∗ 2.420∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.235) (0.219) (0.427)
sigmagain 0.394 0.0147∗
(0.339) (0.00616)
sigmaloss 7.749 100.7
(5.490) (116.2)
N 4738 4722
AIC 6036.6 5384.9
ll -3004.3 -2678.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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TABLE 19. Individual Estimates
mean sd count min max
alpha0money .502 1.501 67 -3.455 4.527
alpha0leisure -.287 1.220 68 -3.3179 2.944
alpha1money .387 1.436 55 -2.069 5.186
beta1money 1.433 1.426 55 -2.068 4.016
alpha1leisure -.506 2.001 48 -10.782 3.499
beta1leisure 1.566 1.896 48 -3.680 5.351
4.6 Individual Results
Our experiment also allows us to investigate individual risk preferences for
both money and leisure, and for gains and losses. Unfortunately, the two-parameter
model converges for both money and leisure for only 33 out of 79 subjects. When
restricted to the one-parameter model, we have estimates in both money and leisure
for 59 subjects. Note that “alpha0” denotes the measured α in the one-parameter
model, while “alpha1” and “beta1” are estimates from the two-parameter model.
Table 19 shows summary statistics for all the reported risk preference parameters,
and Figure 8 shows histograms of all the different measures of risk preference (with
a few outliers removed). All of these graphs reflect a wide range of risk attitudes,
ranging from very risk-averse to very risk-seeking.
Table 20 shows the correlations between the six estimates of risk preferences,
and Figure 6 shows three of these relationships in scatter plots: the one-parameter
estimates for money and leisure, and comparing preferences of gains versus
losses for both money and leisure. Stars on the table reflect significance of these
relationships in a simple linear regression model.
Not surprisingly, we find strong correlations between the one-parameter
estimates and the same-domain two-parameter estimates, as these are explaining
the same phenomenon. We also find negative correlations between α and β for both
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FIGURE 8. Individual Histograms
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TABLE 20. Individual Correlations
alpha0mon alpha1mon beta1mon alpha0leis alpha1leis beta1leis
alpha0money 1
alpha1money 0.6493*** 1
beta1money -0.7812*** -0.1602* 1
alpha0leisure 0.181 0.3407 -0.0054 1
alpha1leisure 0.3242 0.3622 -0.3051* 0.6696*** 1
beta1leisure 0.0006 -0.0946 -0.1219 -0.8217*** -0.2886* 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
FIGURE 9. Individual Scatter Plots
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money and leisure: subjects who are more risk-averse in gains are also more risk-
averse in losses. These correlations are significant but relatively small: individuals
vary widely in how they view gains versus losses. We also have somewhat large
correlations between preferences for money and leisure: individuals who are risk-
averse to one seem to be more risk-averse in the other domain. However, these
cross-domain correlations are mostly not significant, perhaps due to a small sample
size: we only recovered estimates for money and leisure for 33 subjects.
These results show that while there is some connection between individual
risk preferences for money and for effort, they are only marginally correlated:
most of the individual variation in risk preference for leisure are not predicted by
variation in the money domain. Therefore, while risk preferences for money may
serve as a weak approximation for risk preferences for effort and leisure, any deeper
analysis of behavior over effort requires specific knowledge of preferences for effort.
4.7 Conclusion
With this experiment, we have shown that risk preferences for real-effort
tasks and risk preferences for money are distinct: they are correlated with different
demographics and covariates, and only very weakly predict each other at an
individual level. This is particularly surprising: while we find a wide range of risk
preferences for both money and leisure in our sample, individuals who are risk-
averse over money are only slightly more likely to be risk-averse over leisure. Also,
our experiment finds little evidence of the traditional “fourfold pattern” which
includes being risk-seeking over losses. Subjects are clearly risk-averse over losses
of leisure in all framings, although less so than with gains. Our experimental design
does not allow for direct utility comparisons of gains and losses, but we do find
differences in utility curvature over gains versus losses for both money and leisure,
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even when losses are measured as the final resulting gain. However, we find only
a weak connection between risk preferences over gains and over losses, in both the
money and leisure domains.
Because we find that risk preferences for money and leisure are only weakly
connected and with very different absolute levels, structural assumptions about
risk across different domains may not be accurate, and continued research into risk
preferences in different domains is warranted. More careful study focusing on what
causes these differences across domains may be warranted. Future research may
use alternative experimental techniques to further investigate risk preferences for
leisure, and possibly investigate risk preferences over combinations of money and
leisure - how do subjects view risks across multiple decision-making domains.
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